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ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
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by
A. Dale Phillips

Chair: Elsie P. Jackson

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT OF GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH
Dissertation

Andrews University
School of Education

Title: AN EXAMINATION OF CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
IN A GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE COMPANY
Name of researcher:
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Date completed: December 2004

Purpose of the Study
Global Motors o f the United States and Baumgart AG of Germany came together
to produce an automobile that was marketable in both countries. Since this project
involved people from two cultures, the purpose of this study was to examine perceived
cultural markers at work during this joint vehicle development project by identifying
these markers and investigating their effects on the overall success of the joint-venture
project.
Methodology
I chose to use a qualitative methodology, specifically focus groups. All engineers
who worked on the project team received an email inviting them to participate and
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assuring them of anonymity. Twenty-seven percent of the project team chose to
participate (a total of 30 participants).

Results
I found only 4 cultural markers that had both a major presence on this first joint
venture project team and affected the success of the project. They were Social Exchange
(motivated by facts vs. emotion), Formality (preference for structured work or
unstructured work), Risk Response (aversion to risk vs. comfort with risk), and Operating
Authority (deference to position authority or expertise authority). Two other cultural
markers were found to have minor impact, Results Orientation (whether a person was
more concerned with the results or the process used to obtain the results) and
Adaptability (Those comments related to whether or not the person seemed to strive for
consensus among parties). There was no evidence found relating to the cultural markers
of Individualism or Use of Time as seen in the literature.

Conclusion
Cultural Markers were present on this joint-venture project team and affected the
success of this project in the following ways:
“Success was impeded early-on. ”
“Faulty assumptions were made. ”
“Timing and performance targets were missed. ”
“There were inappropriate responses to directions. ”
“We assumed we had agreement, when there was no agreement. ”
“Teamwork was non-existent at first. ”
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the worldwide automotive industry existed as a multitude of
independent car companies that were regionally or nationally focused. Examples include,
but are not limited to, Volvo and Saab in Sweden, Rolls Royce, Range Rover and Vauxhall
in England, and Adam Opel in Germany. These car companies designed, engineered,
manufactured and sold vehicles for their specific national and regional markets.
Manufacture of each car line required separate budgets and each car line was, therefore,
expensive to bring to market. In order to dramatically reduce research and development
expense, as well as other overhead and production expenses, today’s industry strategy is to
jointly develop the next generation of automobiles. This involves consolidation of many
car companies and autonomous automotive partnerships as possible into a few large
companies, under the banner o f "Global Car Companies" (Guilford, 2001).
Insiders predict that globally oriented vehicle development programs will
eventually result in four global car companies-two that are U.S. based, one that is based in
Germany, and one that is based in Japan (Chappell, 1996; Deans, Kroeger, & Zeisel,
2002).
Implementing a global business strategy holds three main advantages:
1. It greatly increases the number of potential customers.

1
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2. It allows for more efficient use of resources that already exist.
3. It lowers the cost of developing new resources by looking at other global
locations.
Despite these advantages, globalization represents serious challenges to the way the
automotive industry has traditionally conducted its business (Rehfeld, 2001). Automotive
partnerships were autonomous operations within a corporate umbrella and, as such, were
free to develop vehicle products for their market. They had an organizational culture
(defined as the deeper understanding of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by
members of the organization) that was shaped by their country of origin or their
nationality. This culture drove organizational structure and behavior. Joint development of
a global vehicle product, which requires partnerships outside of their organization,
removes that autonomy.
Global vehicle products involve partnerships between two or more of the formerly
independent car companies. Each company allocates its share of the resources (financial,
personnel, and facilities) required to support development of the new product. Since
employees come from each company involved in the partnership, they may speak many
different languages. In addition their ideas are imbedded in their own nationalistic and
organizational cultures (Hickens, 1998). These ideas can result in cultural markers (defined
as patterns of beliefs and values that are attributable to a specific group of people).
The idea of combining several entities to form a union is not a new concept. In the
aftermath of World War II, a number of European leaders came to believe that the only
way to avoid future wars was to unite the countries economically and politically, thus
forming the European Union.
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EUROPA (The European Union Online) provides a concise, year-by-year history
of the evolution of the European Union (Europa, n.d.) In 1950, French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman proposed integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. The
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up with six members: Belgium,
West Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The ECSC was such a
success that, within a few years, these same six countries integrated other sectors of their
economies. In 1957 they signed the Treaties of Rome, creating the European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The
member states set about removing trade barriers between them and forming a common
market.
In 1967, the three communities (ECSC, EURATOM, and EEC) merged. From this
point on, there was a single Commission, a single Council Of Ministers and the European
Parliament. Originally, the members of the European Parliament were chosen by national
parliaments. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the European
Union. In 1979, the first direct elections were held, allowing the citizens of the member
states to vote for the candidate of their choice. Since then, direct elections are held or
interests every 5 years.
In 1981, Greece joined the European Union. In 1986, Spain and Portugal joined. In
1992, The Treaty of Maastricht introduced new forms of co-operation between the member
governments, such as In the area of defense, justice, and home affairs. The treaty further
created the European Union. These countries make joint decisions on many matters, such
as agricultural policy, consumer protection, environmental policy, energy policy and
transportation and trade.
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In 1992 the European Union (EU) decided to introduce a single European currency,
managed by a European Central Bank. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the
European Union, with ten more countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta) joining the European Union in May of 2004.
The Europe of the future will have a common currency (on January 1, 2002, the
Euro notes and coins replaced the national currencies In most of the European Union
countries). They plan to eventually have a common foreign and defense policy, and a
common body of laws. Whereas it now looks like a confederacy of individual and
sovereign states, it will look more like a federal system, starting to resemble a "United
States of Europe" (Walker, 2000). Therefore, it can be expected that the European Union
will evolve into the next formidable “superpower” on equal status with the United States.
The development of the European Union has involved the dismantling of barriers to
the movement of goods, capital and labor within Europe. They are now evolving to include
a sense of European citizenship (Parker, 1998). This European experiment has influenced
people who once limited themselves to a nationality to talk about European Citizenship. In
addition, the standardization of the Euro as currency has opened the door for businesses in
various countries to form more joint partnerships with countries outside of the European
Union.

Statement of the Problem
Global Motors North America and Baumgart AG of Germany (pseudonyms for
actual car companies), each produce their own small car for their own market. The problem
was that each car sells to a limited market. By developing one small car to meet the needs
of both markets, the two companies can reduce their costs, consequently.
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Plans were made to develop the small car in the United States and sell this vehicle
in both markets. Engineers from Germany came to work with the U.S engineers on the
development of that car. However, the project was not as efficient and cost effective as
hoped. The main problems encountered were delays in creating vehicle designs and
incorrectly interpreting work direction. Since the engineers were from various cultural
backgrounds, organizers of the project wanted to know what cultural markers were
prominent in this project, and if these markers affected the completion of the project.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine perceived behaviors at work during the
joint vehicle development project between Global Motors North America and Baumgart
AG that were culturally based (cultural markers) and then investigate the effects of those
behaviors on the overall success of the joint venture project.

Research Questions
1. What were the cultural markers that were prominent during this joint venture
project, as perceived by the engineers who worked on the project?
2. How did these cultural markers affect the overall success o f the project, as
perceived by the engineers who worked on the project?

The Setting
Global Motors
Multinational corporations, such as Global Motors, have recognized that the world
is fast becoming a global economy. They recognize that the speed that knowledge can now
travel and a reduction in trade barriers have removed restrictions that once impeded
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international competition. To compete in the worldwide marketplace, multinational
corporations must gain in efficiencies to offset the loss of artificial economic supports
(such as the removal or reduction of trade barriers). Global Motors believes that there are
economies of scale available (an economic theory stating that there will be a decrease in
the marginal cost of production as the number of items produced increases), not only from
the manufacturing environment, but from the engineering environment as well. Under this
strategy, Global Motors North America and Baumgart AG of Germany embarked on a
vehicle development project to jointly develop a class of vehicles to be built from one
basic design. The intent was to market one basic vehicle worldwide at a reduced cost per
vehicle. This first project was not as successful as hoped. Deadlines were missed and cost
targets were not achieved. The company wanted to study the causes of less than desired
results.

Baumgart AG
During the prosperous times of the automobile boom at the beginning of the 20th
century, Baumgart AG (automotive group) of Germany existed as its own company,
producing cars for the Eastern Europe market. In the 1930s Global Motors obtained
controlling interest, but allowed the company continued to manage its own business,
recognizing the German customer. After World War II, Global Motors began to gradually
become more involved in day to day operations.
In 2002, Global Motors began implementing the plan to become a global company.
The Baumgart AG factory in Baumgart Germany was selected the first to produce the first
joint-venture cars. The vehicle will eventually be built in Germany, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and the United States. Each country will have its own distinctive body style but
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will share the same mechanical systems. Vehicles will look different visually but be
extremely similar in their mechanical components.

Significance of the Study
Joint vehicle development is a strategy of the Global Motors business plan.
Understanding the effects or non-effects of cultural markers within this enterprise will help
remove systematic weaknesses in the process of designing a vehicle. If cultural markers are
a significant factor in the financial success of a vehicle program, remedies can be designed
and implemented to reduce this problem in the future. Reducing misunderstandings that
can cause mistakes should increase the success of the next joint project.

Limitations of the Study
Data came from only those engineers who volunteered to participate in the focus
group sessions limited this study.

Delimitations of the Study
Global Motors has numerous plants and partnerships in many countries around the
world. This study was limited to the partnership between Global Motors, located in the
United States, and Baumgart AG of West Germany, located in West Germany, and only to
engineers assigned to this particular joint vehicle specific project. One hundred and ten
engineers received invitations to participate in this volunteer study, from which a group of
30 engineers accepted. No attempt was made to evaluate reasons for non-participation of
the remaining members o f the group.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8

Conceptual Framework
This study focused on cultural markers. They were developed from the studies of
Edward Hall, who looked at culture as communication, Fons Trompenaars and Charles
Hampden-Tumer, who thought of culture as the way people solve problems, and Geert
Hofstede, who evaluated culture as how people adapt themselves within a society.

Edward T. Hall
Edward T. Hall (1973) envision a culture model best represented by an “onion”, the
outer layer being only the 10% of culture that is visible. The remainder of the onion was a
system for creating, sending, storing, and processing information. He believes that two
forms o f information guide humans, the first of these is Manifest Culture. In Manifest
Culture, communication is either verbal or written. Both words and numbers are used in
the process. Hall says that this form of interaction represents only about 10% of all
communication that occurs. Words and sentences have different meanings depending on
the context in which they are embedded. The rules vary from culture to culture. A low
context message assumes that the other person or group has a limited level of knowledge
about the subject discussed and requires explicit communication. An example might be an
instance where a highly qualified college English Instructor is asked to manage a college
bookstore. They would probably need explicit instruction in inventory management and
financial reporting.
A high context message assumes that the other person or group has a high level of
knowledge about the subject discussed and requires only implicit communication. An
example could be where an automotive electronic engineer had previously been
responsible for the automotive entertainment systems (such as radios, CD players, stereo
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speakers) and is now assigned to engine electronics. The person instructing could assume
that the engineer understood broad electronic principles and would now only need specific
instruction in the unique parts of the system that manages the running of the engine.
The second form is Tacit-acquired Culture, where communication is based on
practices and solutions to problems from past experiences of everyday life. This type of
communication is highly situational and operates according to rules where an individual is
not aware of the process. An example would be where a person grew up from childhood in
an environment where people were not trustworthy. As an adult, that person is not aware
that they use non-verbal behaviors that say that communicates a lack of trust. Non-verbal
communication is responsible for the greatest distortions in understanding between people.
Hall believes that this interaction represents about 90% of all communication that occurs
but is largely overlooked in the world of business.
The term proxemics was introduced by Hall (1992) when he investigated people’s
use of personal space. He used four categories: Intimate distance, for embracing or
whispering; personal distance, for conversations among friends; social distance, for
conversations among acquaintances and public distance, used for public speaking. He
found that Germans and Americans conflict over personal space.
Edward Hall (1973) also considers time as a kind o f language or communication.
He says that time is not universal, that different time systems exist around the world. He
defines two basic time systems:
1. Monochronic time means paying attention to and doing only one thing at a
time. Time is therefore linear and time is divided into segments. Hall calls this M-Time.
2. Polychronic time means being involved with many things at once. Hall calls
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this P-Time.
Both M-Time and P-Time systems have their strengths and weaknesses. M-Time
stresses adherence to a schedule. It dominates the official worlds of government and big
business and creates big, centralized bureaucracies. P-Time stresses the involvement of
people and completion of transactions rather than adherence to a schedule. Their successes
are highly situational.
This study uses Hall’s theories of Manifest culture, Tacit-acquired culture,
Proxmetics and time as communication as a basis for analyzing focus group data output.

Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner
Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner (2001) look at culture from the
aspect of how "problem solving" occurs. They define culture as "the way a group of people
solve problems and reconcile dilemmas."
Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer contend that culture goes back to the very
beginning of human existence. They say that early humans had to adapt to their
environment or parish. Individual human beings eventually realized that by banding
together in “tribes” of people, they could more thoroughly manage their environment.
Because different groups were located in different regions of the globe, their environments
called for different solutions for survival.
In today’s world, Trompenaars and Hampden-T umer apply the same principles to
modem society. Whereas survival was once the target, success is now the common goal.
They believe that problem solving achieves that success.
Today, they contend that the nature of “tribes” has changed. Ancient man was
constrained by geography. Groups with common goals or interests are now the “tribes” of
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modem man and they exist in a hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy is national interests,
followed by regional interests, organizational interests, professional interests, and personal
values.
Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer define seven value dimensions that shape how a
culture approaches problem solving. (They expect Americans and Germans to be in
conflict over numbers 1 & 3.)
1. Universalism versus Particularism: Universalism stresses standardization and
rules. Particularism stresses adaptability to circumstances. (Germans would be expected to
use a universalism approach in their problem solving.)
2. Communitarianism versus Individualism: Do people consider themselves as
individuals or part of a group?
3. Neutral versus Emotional: Do people contain their emotions or express them
freely? (Germans would be expected to be Neutral or at least stoic in their problem solving.
4. Defuse versus Specific: Do people see their life as segments, each unique unto
itself, or do they see their life segments as parts of a whole?
5. Achievement versus Ascription: Do people value social position or do they
value performance?
6. Human-time relationship: Do people value short-term or long-term success?
7. Human-nature relationship: Do people view themselves as part of nature or as
masters of nature?

Geert Hofstede
Geert Hofstede formulated national culture theory over 20 years ago, using the
responses of IBM middle managers in 53 countries to generate a cultural profile for each
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country- Hofstede (1980) found differences existed in four dimensions that were typical for
each country. These dimensions are:
1. Power distance, which he defines as the extent to which the less powerful
accept power distributed unequally
2.

Individualism, which can be interpreted as whether the society values the good

of the few or the good of the many
3. Masculinity, which is identified as the extent to which social gender roles are
distinct within a society
4. Uncertainty avoidance, which he defines as the extent to which a society feels
threatened by the unknown.
Hofstede (1980) cautions that one cannot predict individual behavior using his
research. The unit of analysis is the countrywide level, and thus predictions can only be
made at that level. He feels that researchers run the risk of making two types of errors
when referring to his findings, using data collected countrywide to predict individual
behavior and using research correlated at the individual level to explain countrywide data.
Of particular interest to this study is the cultural profiles developed by Hofstede for
the countries o f Germany and the United States, and the organizations that exist within
them. This study analyses focus group output to address the relationship it has to these
profiles.
Hofstede’s (1980) analysis for Germany shows their emphasis on individualism,
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Power distance and long-term orientation are both
ranked considerably lower than the others. This illustrates Germany’s belief in equality and
opportunity for each citizen, as well as its ability to change and adapt rapidly. Most likely
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Germans are uncomfortable with uncertainty, and they are individualistic. Germans like to
set rules and stick with them. They do not feel comfortable if they do not have fully control
over the situation. Privacy is very important to Germans. Most German managers have
their own office and the door is always closed. In general, Germans are very
straightforward and they pride themselves on speaking their mind. Punctuality is highly
valued; schedules and meeting agendas are strictly followed.
Hofstede’s (1980) analysis for the United States is very similar to other world
countries that have their heritage founded in Europe with strong ties to the British Isles.
Individualism ranks highest and is a significant factor in the life of U.S. Americans. The
low ranking of Long-term Orientation reflects a freedom in the culture from long-term
traditional commitments, which allows greater flexibility and the freedom to react quickly
to new opportunities.

Definition of Terms
The following is a list of terms used for this study and their definitions:
Car (or Vehicle) Platform: The basic chassis used as a base to create different
vehicles for different customers.
Cross-cultural: Any activity that must involve people of more than one culture.
Culture: Organizational researchers generally agree that culture refers to patterns
of beliefs and values that are manifested in practices, behaviors, and various artifacts
shared by members of an organization or a nation.
a.

Production Culture: Arises when the production process is routine and

the work is standardized. The consumer product is easily identified as the output.
The focus is on the number of items successfully produced.
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b. Professional Culture: Arises when the task is very non-routine and
difficult, and highly specialized personnel do the work. This culture sets the norms
themselves and is process oriented, not product oriented.
c. Traditional Culture: Within an organization, it describes an assimilation
of cultures that have continued since the days of the organization’s founding.
d. B ureaucratic culture: Within an organization, the tasks include routine
elements and the process by which inputs are converted into outputs becomes
obscure. Often, a bureaucratic culture is found when job elements include
documentation that reports actions taken and results obtained.
Cultural Marker: Validated patterns of beliefs and values that are attributable to a
specific group o f people.
Cultural Pluralism: A society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial,
religious and social groups maintain participation in and development of their traditions
and special interests while cooperatively working toward the interdependence needed for a
nation's unity.
Discussion Guide: A critical first step for the planning of focus groups. It is the
“script” that the facilitator will follow during the sessions in order to ensure that attention
is placed on the topics he or she must explore.
Economies of Scale: An economic theory stating that there will be a decrease in
the marginal cost of production as the number of items produced increases.
Facilitator/M oderator: Interchangeable terms that identify the person who is
assigned the role o f keeping a discussion on track for the purpose of reaching a successful
conclusion.
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Globalization: The present worldwide drive toward an economic system
dominated by supranational corporate trade and banking institutions that are not
accountable to democratic processes or national governments.
Next Generation of Automobile: The next new vehicles that will encompass new
technology, new engineering theory and new design.
Organizational Culture: The deeper understanding ofbasic assumptions and
beliefs that are shared by members of the organization.
Plant Capacity: Defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as the maximum or optimum
level of production or output.
Quality Function Deployment: An assessment tool used by industry to develop a
disciplined approach for product and process planning.
Triangulation: A validity procedure where researchers search for convergence
among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a
study. The term comes from military navigation at sea where sailors triangulated among
different distant points to determine their ship's bearing.

O rganization of the Study
Chapter 1 consists of the background o f the current study, a statement of the
problem, the purpose of the study, definitions o f terms, limitations and delimitations of the
study, conceptual framework, and a description of the organization of the study.
Chapter 2 consists of a review of the literature. Information will be provided on
organizational culture, cross cultural issues and cultural markers.
Chapter 3 addresses the methodology o f the study, the role of the researcher, data
analysis procedure and the study procedure employed.
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Chapter 4 presents the findings of the study, data analysis procedure, method of
verification, and foundation for themes developed.
Chapter 5 consists of the summary, conclusions, recommendations and implication
for future research.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

Literature reviewed for this study covers three major areas: organizational culture
(including organizational culture and global companies), cross-cultural issues, and
cultural markers.

Organizational Culture
The organizational culture perspective represents a conflict within organizational
theory that challenges the traditional structural and systems perspectives about how
decisions are made and how organizations respond to the environment. Organizational
culture can be defined as the deeper understanding of basic assumptions and beliefs that
are shared by members of the organization.
Schein (1996) describes three levels of culture that exist in all organizational
relationships: artifacts; shared values; and shared basic assumptions.
1.

Artifacts are visible, audible, tactile manifestations o f underlying cultural

assumptions, such as behavior patterns, rituals, physical environment, dress codes,
stories, and myths. They are relatively easy to understand. For example, many firms have
dress codes, such as uniforms or proper business attire, indicative o f some underlying
culture.

17
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2. Shared values, also quite easily understood, are the espoused reasons why
things should be as they are, such as norms, codes of ethics, company value statements,
and so on. For example, many firms have goal or mission statements in their reception
areas for all to see, informing both their customers and their employees what the firm
stands for, and saying something about the espoused culture as well. Similarly, some
firms have codes o f ethics, which are often related to the professional norms of their
employees.
3. Basic assumptions are somewhat more difficult to define and examine. They
comprise the invisible but identifiable reasons why group members perceive, think, and
feel the way they do about external survival and internal operational issues, such as a
mission, means of problem solving, relationships, time, and space.
Of considerable importance, in Schein's (1991) view, is the need for senior
management to focus on this third level of culture. Artifacts can be replaced; new values
can be articulated. But unless the basic assumptions are addressed, the firm's culture will
likely remain the same or change only slightly.
A strong organizational culture increases consistency o f behavior across
individuals in a firm. In this sense, it becomes a social control mechanism (O'Reilly,
1989). At the same time, organizational cultures frame people's basic assumptions about
organizational processes and their interpretations of organizational events. Schein (1991)
emphasizes that organizational cultures provide group members with a way of giving
meaning to their daily lives, setting guidelines and rules for how to behave.
Viability of a firm’s performance depends not only on the ability to maintain
consistency in internal processes but also on the firm’s ability to adapt to change in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

environment. The relationship between culture strength and reliability of performance is
directly related to how strong-culture firms learn from their own experiences and from
changes in the environment (Gordon & DiTomaso, 1992). Despite different definitions of
culture, organizational researchers generally agree that culture refers to patterns of beliefs
and values that are manifested in practices, behaviors, and various artifacts shared by
members of an organization or a nation (Hofstede, 1980).
In relatively stable environments, firms with strong organizational culture have
less variable performance than firms with weak corporate culture. In a volatile work
environment, incremental adjustments are probably not sufficient. Strong-culture firms
have often met great difficulties in responding to change (Tushman & O’Reilly, 1997).
Organizational cultures and organizational learning are closely related. In fact,
several authors (Casmir, 1999; Fox, 1997; Kim, 1991) have conceptualized
organizational cultures as the product of histories of organizational learning. Schein
(1991) suggests that culture ultimately reflects the group's effort to cope and learn and is
the residue of learning processes. Schein (1991) further argues that organizational
cultures are strongly influenced by shared experiences in the firm's early history and that,
once established and taken for granted, the firm's basic assumptions are difficult to
change. Freeman and Hannan (1984) suggest that organizational cultures reflect the
imprinting of a firm's early environmental conditions and that, therefore, they are subject
to pressures to not change.
The significance of organizational culture to the strategic change process is well
recognized. Culture has been shown to influence the ability of the organization to control
and cope with strategic change. Consequently, only if one appreciates the basic culture
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and values that influence the key strategic elements can organizational strategy be
understood, implemented, and changed.
Gordon and DiTomaso (1992) have shown that widespread agreement about
organizational culture (basic assumptions and values) in the firm increases behavioral
consistency and thereby enhances organizational performance. The impact of consistency
on execution is important, since firms with excellent strategies may perform poorly if
they fail to execute well, and firms that execute their routines extremely well may
compensate for less than perfect strategies.
Levinthal (1991) argues that firms with strong organizational culture should
generally be better at avoiding internal threats to reliable performance, or breakdowns in
coordination and control. Employees are more likely to take actions consistent with a
firm's goals if they understand those goals and agree with them. Cremer (1993) says that
where employees lack a clear understanding of the organization's goals, coordination will
also be more difficult. They are more likely to take actions that conflict with what is
happening in other parts o f the organization. If employees differ in their understandings,
they will either spend more time debating alternatives or behave inconsistently and,
therefore, be more likely to carry out routine tasks poorly.
In simulations, March (1991) found that organizations that are good at learning
from their members have the most accurate understanding of a changing environmental
reality. Strong-culture organizations exhibit the opposite characteristics. Strong-culture
organizations may be less likely to reap the benefits of any exploration that does occur.
Martin and Siehl (1983) show that innovation and change in organizational routines can
be fostered by viable countercultures, but countercultures may be less likely to emerge
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and persist in strong-culture firms. Moreover, even when countercultures can be
sustained in strong-culture firms, the transfer of new ideas and knowledge to the
dominant culture is fraught with difficulty.
Organizational policies, procedures, and organizational structure are often seen as
independent of social reality. In this day o f globalization, the fallacy of this line of
thought is evident. People come to organizations with whole systems of meaning and
understandings, defined by their respective nationalistic and regional cultures.

Organizational Culture and Global Companies
In today’s economy, companies who once were regionally based now must leam
to compete in the global market. Where regionally based organizational culture once
sufficed, they must now develop and adapt to a globally based organizational culture.
One model useful in categorizing global corporate organizational culture emphasizes the
extent to which firms have evolved as global companies (Heenan & Perlmutter, 1979).
The model asserts that corporations can be classified as nationally (or home country)
oriented, where they operate independently and autonomously and focus on local
objectives. They can be regionally oriented, where they operate interdependently within a
limited area and focus on regional issues, or they can be globally oriented-operating
interdependently worldwide, with worldwide objectives and extensive multicultural
heterogeneity.
Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) talk about three types of international
companies, which are distinguishable by the following organizational characteristics:
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1. Global Companies: They tend have local branches of their company ruled by
strategies and methods dictated by a corporate home office. Little or no local autonomy is
allowed.
2. Multi-Local Companies: They tend to consist of self-sustaining and fairly
autonomous business units throughout the world. Their connection to corporate
headquarters consists of financial ties only.
3. Transnational Companies: They reconcile differences and similarities between
the values of corporate headquarters and overseas operations and apply certain strategies
universally. They find a way to adopt local values when those are understood to be the
best way of achieving business goals.
No matter how global companies are classified, significant cross-cultural
problems exist within the international context. Management must maintain compatibility
of practices and policies among its subsidiaries. It must also maintain a delicate balance
of authority, bureaucracy, validity, and accountability.
Organizational culture differences differentiate partners based on their
management practices, which are deemed essential for the functioning of their respective
organizations. Differences in practices represent conflicting expectations and
incompatible organizational processes. Partners with dissimilar organizational cultures
may expend time and energy to establish managerial practices and routines to facilitate
interaction, and may incur higher costs and more mistrust than culturally similar partners
(Park & Ungson, 1997). Research on organizational climate similarity and performance
also indicates that firms selecting a partner that has a similar organizational climate will
have superior performance (Fey & Beamish, 2000). They hypothesize that differences in
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organizational culture would adversely influence joint venture performance. Global
ventures take a variety of forms, including joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and
global product programs. Corporate decision-makers in many firms have tended to pay
more attention to “strategic fit” than to organizational-integration issues.
Further, it was also found that within international and domestic mergers and
acquisitions, national and organizational cultures are separate constructs. They have
variable attitudinal and behavioral correlates. As such, it is also widely accepted that
organizational culture is nested in national culture. Newman and Nollen (1996) reported
that work units perform better when their management practices are compatible with the
national culture. They advocate that management practices should be adapted to national
culture for high performance.
Lane and Beamish (1990) state that the problems in International Joint Ventures
(IJV) often stem from the influence of national culture on behavior and management
systems. For example, cooperation-generating mechanisms vary between individualist
and collectivist cultures because of the differences in their motives (Chen, Chen, &
Meindl, 1998). In the context ofIJVs, diversity along each cultural characteristic can be
instrumental in erecting significant barriers to effective cooperation (Parkhe, 1993).
Organizational cultural differences make it costly to negotiate and transfer
management practices and firm-specific technologies. Since national culture is perceived
to be the fundamental differential factor in an UV, even superficial differences might
result in the partners choosing national culture as a primary form o f identity (Salk &
Brannen, 2000). A salient social identity leads to accentuation of similarities and
differences between partners, perhaps causing individual differences to be associated
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with nationality (Salk & Brannen, 2000). Accordingly, IJV partners from different
national cultures experience greater difficulty in their interactions (Lane & Beamish,
1990) that would adversely influence joint venture performance.
Culture clashes can occur between the policies of parent headquarters and the
norms and values of employees in foreign subsidiaries, or between U.S. managers and
their foreign counterparts. Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) define the next
frontier of international business as reconciliation, whereby a company uses the tensions
that exist between cultural values to create dynamic solutions. They do not accept the
differences and try to tiptoe around them; they use them to synthesize approaches and
energize the organization to achieve common goals. They reconcile their differences
between their corporate cultures and indigenous national cultures and focus on what they
have in common. Culture clashes between U.S. companies and their local affiliates
usually result from the need to standardize systems and procedures.
Tropenaars and Hampden-T umer (2001) say that in every culture in the world,
authority, bureaucracy, validation, and accountability are experienced in different ways.
The problem is that words can take on different meanings as they move from culture to
culture. The managers of global organizations must maintain a delicate balance between
the need for standardization in organizational design and procedures, and local
characteristics of the market, legislation, and the socio-political-cultural system. The
silent forces of culture can operate a destructive process against centrally developed
methods that do not fit locally.
Because organizations are, in many ways, embedded in the larger society,
research on cultural differences of cross-national businesses should examine both
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national and organizational cultures. But with few exceptions (Hofstede, Neuijen,
Ohayv, Sanders, 1990; Newman & Nollen, 1996), past studies have not been concerned
with culture distance at both levels. These studies found that, whereas organizations from
different nations differ in fundamental values, organizations from the same nation differ
only in organizational practices. The studies further concluded that when both national
and organizational cultures are examined, the former should be examined in terms of
values, and the latter in terms of core organizational practices.
Hofstede et al. (1990) suggest six core organizational practices that differentiate
organizations in their management orientation:
1. Process vs. result: Is the organization first concerned that the prescribed work
process be followed or that results be accomplished?
2. Employee vs. job: Does the organization place equal importance on the
employee’s needs along with the job to be done?
3. Parochial vs. professional: Does the organization exclude knowledge that
comes from outside of the organization or is it receptive?
4. Open vs. closed system: Does the organization include all levels of
employees or does it exclude other internal groups?
5. Loose vs. tight control: Does every decision require approval?
6. Normative vs. pragmatic: Are employees allowed to adapt their behavior
when they feel it is called for?
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Organizational Subcultures
Under the umbrella of organizational culture, “subcultures” develop. Subcultures
arise when groups of people have a specific responsibility. Jones (1983) identified
distinct subcultures within an organizational structure:
1. Production culture arises when the production process is routine and the work
is standardized. The consumer product is easily identified as the output.
2. Bureaucratic culture arises when the task includes routine elements and the
process by which inputs are converted into outputs becomes obscure. The supporting
paperwork or information is the output.
3. Professional culture arises when the task is very nonroutine and difficult, and
highly specialized personnel do the work. This culture sets the norms and is process
oriented, not product oriented. The output is not so much the consumer product as it is the
process by which the idea for the consumer product is created. See Figure 1.
All o f the above-mentioned organizational subcultures interact with one another
and are sources of potential cultural conflict. The production culture feels that there is too
much paperwork required to get the job done. The bureaucratic culture wants the
engineer (professional) to make up their mind and supply information on time. The
professional engineers think their designs are perfect, the production culture does not
know how to build things, and so on. All three subcultures are driven by their own sets of
internal beliefs and values. The process by which they interact and resolve issues defines
their local organizational culture.
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Interaction of Organizational Cultures
Figure 2 shows how national culture drives regional culture, which in turn is the
primary driver of organizational culture. Within organizational culture, subcultures
develop around whether a group is product, professional or bureaucratically focused. I
call this the organization’s “cultural tree.”

National
Culture

Regional
Culture

Organizational
Culture

Professional
Focused
Organizational
Culture

Bureaucratic
Focused
Organizational
Culture

V "

■>

Product
Focused
Organizational
Culture

Figure 1. Organizational cultural tree.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

When local organizations interact with other organizations within a specific
geographic area, they begin to develop a regional organizational culture. A national
organizational culture evolves when the regional cultures within a country (or alliances of
countries) leam to work together for the common good. When different nationally
focused cultures interact with one another, we have the beginnings of a Globally
Focussed Organizational Culture.
When there is a joining of two organizations for any reason, each organization
brings with it their own “cultural tree”. Each organization must interact with the other at
each level. The arrows in Figure 2 represent this interaction and potential conflict of
cultural markers.
Organization A

Organization B

Figure 2. The interaction o f organizational cultures and cultural markers.
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M anaging Organizational Change
In the past, an organization existed in a local or regional area, supplying goods or
services to that area. As such, it operated in a world where values and norms remained
relatively culturally consistent.
Today, the rapid growth of technology and the speed of communication have
widened our awareness. Organizations, who once set the standard for performance, now
face much stiffer competition. Some other organization can provide the service quicker or
make the product less expensive. In order to remain viable organizations, they must
develop a culture that will embrace change.
According to Schein (1991), senior management can use six organizational
processes to either maintain or modify an existing culture. All must fit together in such a
way that they are mutually reinforcing:
1.

Strategy formulation is the way a firm defines itself and its overall direction.

There are two broad schools of thought on how the process works: the coalitionists and
the top-down theorists. The coalitionists believe that a firm's strategy should be the end
result of a series of struggles among competing groups within the corporation. The result
is an "amalgamated strategy," which is the sum total of all the individual coalition
strategies. The top-down theorists argue that strategy formulation should follow a threestep process, generally referred to as a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats) analysis. In this process, senior management (a) examines the environment and
assesses the financial, programmatic, and other signals, positive and negative, (b)
compares these environmental signals with the firm's strengths and weaknesses and
incorporates the firm's values into the analysis, and (c) selects a strategic direction.
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In the top-down approach, Schein (1991) says that a basic assumption is that
strategic choices are made centrally, and the various organizational units contribute to the
chosen strategic direction.
In the coalition approach, a basic assumption is that many strategic decisions are
made by the coalitions without significant input from corporate headquarters.
2. Authority and influence (AM) can flow in a variety of ways in an organization,
ranging from hierarchical to collegial. The former is exemplified by the military; the
latter by many universities. Although an organization chart can identify the formal
authority arrangements, it frequently excludes many key decision-makers.
Schein (1991) further adds that all must fit together in such a way that they are
mutually reinforcing. For a unified culture, the flow of authority and influence must
reinforce senior-management decisions concerning the strategy formulation process. If
senior management decides to formulate strategy without the involvement of middle
managers and others, it will have a difficult time espousing a collegial flow o f A&I.
3. According to Schein (1991), when considering the motivation process, senior
managers must focus on a fit among employee personalities and the firm's external
environment, including customers, competitors, regulators, lenders, and shareholders.
The motivation process can reinforce the A&I process. Motivation for workers on
an assembly line might be tied to work standards, with supplemental compensation linked
to increased productivity. By contrast, motivation for scientists engaged in exploratory
research might be related to collaboration and the sharing of ideas, with recognition and
peer approval seen as more important than financial rewards. In either case, the
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motivation process constitutes an important lever for affecting the culture. Others provide
non-fmancial bonuses, such as sabbatical leaves.
The design of the motivation process depends to a great extent on the kind of
culture senior management seeks. As with other levers, it will affect employees'
understanding of what is desirable and undesirable behavior.
4. Schein (1991) recognizes that the management control process consists of four
activities: programming (planning), budgeting, measuring, and reporting.
In many firms, decision making about new programs and large capital
expenditures tries to ensure that programs (or product lines) are consistent with strategy.
Program or product line managers must understand the linkages between their activities
and the firm's overall strategic direction.
In short, the way management establishes the constraints on and the approaches to
programming can have a profound impact on the firm's culture. Centralizing revenue and
establishing expense centers, for example, are consistent with a hierarchical culture,
whereas the use of profit centers is more consistent with a collegial, coalition-based
culture.
5. Senior management’s response to a situation of ongoing conflict, according to
Schein (1991), could be to (a) take part in resolving it, (b) appoint a committee to deal
with it, or (c) assign an integrator. All three approaches can be effective, but each
suggests a different culture and a different sense of what is acceptable and unacceptable
behavior. Similarly, the membership of both permanent committees and ad hoc task
forces sends important cultural signals. If senior management were to combine an equal
number of middle managers and assembly line workers on a reengineering task force, it
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would send a signal to the company about both the importance of line workers' opinions
and the value it attached to middle managers' time. More generally, the approaches taken
by senior management to deal with the several kinds of conflict constitute highly visible
intra-organizational signals of the kind of culture it desires.
6.

Schein (1991) says that customer management includes activities that take

place within the firm as well as those designed to attract customers to the firm. These
activities combine both operations management and marketing, and include product
design and manufacturing, service provision and scheduling, price setting, facility siting,
and the delivery o f after-sale services. All these activities have a heavy cultural overlay.
Schein (1991) believes that artifacts can be replaced; new values can be
articulated. But unless the basic assumptions are addressed, the firm's culture will likely
remain the same or change only slightly.
Any change in the business environment can create problems by increasing the
likelihood of failures in communication, coordination, and control. Change can render
existing organizational routines inadequate or inappropriate. Such environmental shifts
demand learning and modifications in organizational routines that take the new
conditions into account. Heenan and Perlmutter (1979) believe that unless the
organization discovers such solutions rapidly, it will perform poorly.

Organizational Innovation
Comparatively little research has examined innovation across cultures/nations.
This research stream has focused primarily on the diffusion rate of innovations across
borders (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988) or differences in innovative activity (Carlsson &
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Hansen, 1982). Few studies have examined cultural differences in innovation processes
within organizations.
Culture in international management research has been largely defined using
personality-centered research. Innovation processes may differ among cultures because
cultural values are associated with different strategic management activities (Hegarty &
Hoffman, 1990) and different concepts of organization (Hofstede, 1980). These
differences are explained below, but before examining the cross-cultural differences, the
relationship between strategic management activities/characteristics and innovation
influence is described in the following section.
Examining innovation processes at the individual level of analysis, Meyer and
Goes (1988) found that managerial or leadership variables were strong predictors of
innovation processes. Strategic management research conducted at the top management
level of analysis reveals that managers obtain influence because of certain characteristics
they possess or activities they perform in developing strategy (Hoffman & Hegarty,
1993).
Environmental and organizational variables, especially industry and firm size,
affect organizational innovations (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). Industry differences in
innovation processes have been observed previously (Utterback et ah, 1976). Firm size
has been found to be a predictor o f both organization structure (Khandwalla, 1977) as
well as organizational innovations (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981).
The innovation influence process will vary somewhat for each type of
organizational innovation. Innovations represent change; change is usually resisted,
especially by those most affected by the change (Huber & Glick, 1992). Those most
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affected by structural innovations are likely to influence the innovation/change to
minimize its adverse impacts on them (Hoffman & Hegarty, 1993). Structural
innovations often change activities performed, such as environmental scanning (Lenz &
Engledow, 1986), or change the way traditional functions are performed.
As indicated earlier, the purpose of examining culture in the context of innovation
processes is to determine whether such processes vary across cultures. Culture is,
therefore, considered to be primarily a moderator variable, which affects the relationships
among other variables. Hegarty and Hoffman (1990) have demonstrated that culture
moderates innovation influence processes of top managers. The degree to which
executive characteristics determine top management influence on innovations in Western
industrial cultures was examined. For the study, 361 senior managers from 97
manufacturing operations in nine Western nations were asked by Hegarty and Hoffman to
answer a questionnaire. Results showed that, after controlling organization-environment
contextual variables, executive characteristics explain innovation influences. Moreover,
functional expertise, such as access to resources, scanning and planning,is pinpointed as
having more effect on innovations than other executive characteristics (Hamel, 2002).
Findings also revealed that culture does not moderate the relationship between access to
resources and innovations. This investigation examined the moderating effect of culture
on the following relationship; influence on organizational innovations, strategic
management activities, and functional specialty.

Communication and Culture
Communication underlies the effectiveness of coordinating exchange activities by
developing strong relationships, which results in improved performance (Kim, 1991).
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Without effective inter-organizational communications, learning among partners is
diminished and the long-run effectiveness of the relationship may be damaged.
Communication presupposes that there is a particular cultural framework that allows
"translation" of the meaning embedded within communication by the recipient to
maintain the true intent of the communication (Kim, 1991). When business partners
emanate from different cultures (national and organizational), the underlying cultural
inconsistencies in communication patterns create hurdles to the development of effective
global business relationships (Kim, 1991; Mohr & Nevin, 1990). Today, managers
continue to struggle with communication barriers in their international relationships. The
lack of a process to address communication issues presents a gap in the literature.
Instrumental in producing successful international joint ventures (IJV) is the
interaction and coordination of organizational elements. When inconsistencies exist,
underlying differences in operating components create barriers to operations, hindering
effectiveness (Fey & Beamish, 2000; Doty, Glick, & Huber, 1993). Communication
effectiveness in an international relationship can be influenced by the fit between national
and organizational cultures (Fox, 1997; Li, 1999), as well as by the breadth (i.e., the
cultural diversity of members) and ownership structure of the relationship.
National culture provides an implicit theory relating to behavioral expectations in
a variety of situations, including communication (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Moon, 1996).
When business partners that come from very different national cultural orientations
interact, cultural inconsistencies in communication strategies may result in
communication obstacles, hampering performance. National culture encompasses the
values, beliefs, and assumptions that define a distinct way o f life of a group of people and
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is based on the fundamental concepts imparted in early individual development
(Hofstede, 1980). National culture not only is deeply embedded in everyday life but also
shapes how reality is interpreted in a society, such as the distribution and use of power
(Hofstede, 1980), relationship definition (Trompenaars & Hampden-T umer, 2001), and
the appropriate roles and obligations of individuals to individuals and individuals to
organizations.
Culture also has a direct effect on international business communication
effectiveness. Culture is the pattern of shared behaviors, values, and beliefs that provide a
foundation of understanding of the organizational functioning processes and norms
directing employee behavior (Schein, 1985). Organizational culture is an amalgamation
of the national culture and the backgrounds of individuals assembled in the organizational
setting (Schein, 1996). Differences in organizational cultures can lead to
miscommunications and the deterioration of joint efforts (Veiga, Lubatkin, Calori, &
Very, 2000).
Hofstede and Bond (1988) have shown that the interaction of national and
organizational cultures can either facilitate or hinder communication effectiveness,
making these elements critical to consider when assessing communication in international
business relationships. Firms establish multiple international relationships with partners
spanning a diverse set of cultures and consisting of different ownership structures. As the
breadth of a firm’s relationships increases, the cultural diversity of its partners can also
increase, thus increasing the cultural inconsistencies the firm must overcome. The
difficulty in communicating in jointly owned operations is that the organizational culture
becomes a hybrid o f those of the partner organizations. To effectively operate, firms must
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understand the elements influencing the communication patterns between partners,
adapting to those differences when necessary.
Communication competence is a set of abilities and knowledge related to
communication that enables an individual to engage in appropriate/meaningful
communications with international partners (Cui, Vandenberg, & Jiang, 1998; Kim,
1991). Communication competence may vary by cultural distance, frequency, and
effectiveness of past interactions, the level of global experience of a manager, as well as
the learning environment of the organization (Kim, 1991). One looks to a manager's
competencies to assess his/her flexibility and adaptation in communication encounters,
such as his/her ability to adjust, integrate, and establish new manners of communicating
with culturally diverse partners. Communication competencies encompass three broad,
inter-related dimensions: cognitive, affective, and operational (Kim, 1991).
Cognitive competence refers to an individual's ability to ascertain meaning from
verbal and nonverbal language (Applegate & Sypher, 1988; Kim, 1988, 1991). Cognitive
competencies relate the psychological concepts embedded in an individual's values that
influence their ability to accurately decode a partner's message (Kim, 1988, 1991). An
individual's cognitive competencies allow him/her to adjust effectively to communication
differences in highly diverse environments.
Affective competence relates to an individual's emotional tendencies in relation to
communications (Applegate & Sypher, 1988; Kim, 1991). An individual’s affective
competencies are derived from his/her motivational and attitudinal predisposition to
experiences, such as ambiguity tolerance, adaptive motivation, empathic motivation, etc.
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(Kim, 1991). An individual's adherence to mental models influences his/her attitudinal
response to culturally diverse communications.
Behavioral competence refers to an individual's flexibility and resourcefulness in
reacting to communication encounters (Kim, 1991). The domain of behavioral
competencies encompasses behavioral flexibility, communication authenticity, message,
and behavioral complexity, interaction management, etc. (Applegate & Sypher, 1988;
Fox, 1997; Kim, 1991). A manager's behavioral competencies enable him/her to engage
in meaningful interactions with those of many cultures. Lack of behavioral competencies
restricts a manager's flexibility and adaptability to communication encounters that result
in hindering effective relationship development and management. Managers interviewed
consistently indicated that those managers possessing higher levels of behavioral
competency were able to generate new communication and cultural contexts that
facilitated effective communication.
As no two cultures are identical, inherent differences necessitate a negotiation of
communication and cultural protocols for the development of a common communication
environment (Kim, 1991). Through implicit adaptations, a new communication
environment that is unique to the firms in the relationship is established. Casmir (1999)
indicates that communication protocols, appropriateness of strategies, monitoring, and
communication feedback mechanisms are all dynamically adjusted for successful
communication to occur, thus suggesting not only communication interaction, but also
cultural interaction.
Communication interaction refers to the hybridization of communication
protocols within a relationship and, thus, the development of a new set of communication
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patterns for transacting (Casmir, 1999). The interaction of each firm's unique
communication protocol is integrated to establish a set of hybrid norms for
communication within the relationship (Casmir, 1999).
Relational quality refers to the strength of the relationship and the potential for the
relationship to continue the process of relationship development. Relational quality is a
critical goal for firms as it facilitates performance effectiveness. The development of
strong inter-organizational relationships allows firms to capitalize on reductions in direct
transaction costs associated with the exchange process while at the same time increasing
the volume of exchange (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995; Williamson, 1991).
Further, relational quality stimulates stronger, more intimate partnerships, building trust,
commitment, and satisfaction that increases the effectiveness of the relationship, thereby
differentiating it from less coordinated competitors (Barney, 1991; Henderson &
Cockbum, 1994).
Communication interaction involves the hybridization of communication
strategies within a relationship and thus the development of a new communication
culture. Casmir (1999) refers to this new communication environment created through
hybridization of cultural communication strategies as a "third-culture." The third-culture
created through communication interaction has two primary dimensions: norms and
delivery:
First, the interaction of two separate communication cultures is integrated to
establish a set of hybrid norms for communication within the relationship (Casmir, 1999).
Modifications to communication partners' norm sets for communication protocols are
adapted to the new relationship. Casmir (1999) indicates that communication protocols,
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appropriateness of strategies, monitoring, and communication feedback mechanisms are
all dynamically adjusted for successful intercultural communication to occur, thus
suggesting not only communication interaction but also cultural interaction.
Second, delivery aspects of communication are influenced by the intercultural
communication encounter. Delivery aspects include elements of medium, frequency,
appropriate time between communications, and appropriate timing of responses to initial
communications between partners (Mohr & Nevin, 1990). Such patterns as courtesy,
respect, and tolerance for ambiguity both influence and are influenced by cultural
interaction.
Effective communication is the central lifeline of any organization. It is the
vehicle for driving change, shaping expectations and rallying workers around a core
purpose and common message. When managing a geographically diverse workforce, one
that spans the world and crosses cultures, a strategic communication program can
strengthen the organization and support its success; the lack of one can be the linchpin of
organizational demise. "Communication is the life blood of any organization today," says
Lee Homick (as cited in Solomon, 1994, p. 1), president of New York City-based
Business Communications Worldwide and program director of corporate
communications conference planning for The Conference Board, also in New York City.
"Today, you have to develop a proactive relationship. The 'de-layering' of the
organization means that fewer employees are responsible for more things. They need to
know more, whether they're out in the field or in a plant, employees need to know more
to do their jobs."
In addition, many people can be working on the same project from different
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locations-you can have a team in London, one in New York and another in Tokyo. You
also have employees working at home. "Today's organization is one without walls," says
Homick (as cited in Solomon, 1994, p. 1). "Communication is even more important when
you're at different locations. Everyone must have the same organizational and project
goals." HR and communications experts must be aware of the role that culture plays in
communications. In other words, given all these interwoven elements, you must ensure
that the messages employees receive are interpreted as intended. Myths and
misunderstood tales threaten to take your organization off course—a path that is especially
dangerous for global organizations because cultural differences and technology can
distort the process. Careful planning and effective cross-cultural awareness are crucial to
the bottom line. And at a time when rampant change happens quickly—and can affect
different parts of a global business in different ways—you have to begin with a strategy.
The success of business relationships over the long run are contingent on each
partner's investment in each network relationship as well as the partners' ability to
communicate effectively throughout the duration of the relationship (Mohr & Nevin,
1990). Relationship development is based on two distinct relational outcomes. First,
relationship efficiency focuses attention on reducing the direct transaction costs
associated with the exchange process among organizations and at the same time
increasing the volume of exchange. Second, stronger, more intimate relationships
increase the effectiveness of the inter-organizational network, thereby differentiating it
from less well-coordinated competitive networks.
To reap the benefits of strong relational networks in the global marketplace,
effective inter-organizational communications need to be established among members of
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the network. Without effective inter-organizational communications, learning among
network partners will be diminished, and the long-term effectiveness of the network will
be damaged. Communication presupposes that there is a particular cultural framework
that allows "translation" of the message by the recipient to maintain the true meaning of
the sender (Kim, 1991).
One recent example of how inconsistency of the cultural foundation can influence
communication and relationship quality is Daimler-Benz's acquisition of Chrysler Inc.
Because of the two partners' inability to communicate effectively after the acquisition,
duplication of marketing and sales efforts and the lack of an integrated strategic plan led
Daimler-Benz to announce in January 2001 a reduction of 25,000 workers from its U.S.
labor force. Insiders attribute a great deal of the misunderstanding to the cultural
differences in communicating goals and objectives between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler.
Difficulty arises as similarities and unique features among cultures influence
communication among global business partners. This was illustrated in the recent joint
venture among Asahi Glass of Japan, the Samsung Group of Korea, and Coming Glass
International of the United States. Whereas Asahi Glass and Samsung stressed
collectivism and harmony in their communications, Coming focused on formalities and
the achievement o f specific goals. The result was that the enhanced communication
efficiencies between the two Asian companies facilitated their teaming together, to the
exclusion of Coming, and thus ending the original joint venture.
The greater the diversity among organizational cultures, the more difficulty
management will experience in communicating among these organizational units.
Differences among organizational cultures within a network o f organizations can create
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conflict among member firms.' This conflict will negatively affect communications and
may stimulate higher levels of resistance to change. Furthermore, even when a firm
operates within a similar national culture, the macro culture is subdivided into a myriad
of subcultures. Subculture differences are potential communication barriers to effective
network operations. Barriers to free and open communication with employees from
different subcultures, classes, or castes is to be expected and therefore must be taken into
consideration in the management of communications in host countries.
Cultural interaction refers to national and organizational cultural adjustments over
time due to intercultural communication among network partners. The newly created
cultural environment that evolves from ongoing intercultural communication can be
significantly differentiated from established norms in each of the organizations (Casmir,
1999). The adaptation to communication strategies over time influences the processes,
norms, and behavioral characteristics of the cultural environment of each partner in the
global inter-organizational network. The new cultural environment assumes a degree of
integration o f the distinct national and organizational cultures at the dyad level and
potentially a new cultural environment at the network level.
The cognitive, affective, and operational communication adjustments on the part
o f both members of the relationship ultimately affect the core elements of each
organization's national and organizational culture. The greater the level, frequency, and
importance of the intercultural communication, the higher is the probability of blending
the cultures. Therefore, continuous communication patterns between partners have the
potential to create more consistent communication environments. This increases
communication effectiveness and efficiency, task interaction, cultural empathy, social
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interaction, and mutually agreed-on adaptation to communication interactions. The
relationship quality is therefore enhanced. The level and frequency of consistent cultural
interaction between partners has a positive impact on relationship quality over time.
In her dissertation, Karen Thomas (1980) hypothesized that cross-cultural groups
are successful when the group shares a commitment that is highly relevant to each
member, encourages compromise on less important issues and clearly understands and
accepts the rales and procedures of the organization. Others would add that the
organizations’ mission and goals must be clear. Personal agendas could be at variance
with the official mission, or mission statements could run the risk of not being in
harmony with the cultures involved (Budd, 1993).
Although it can be a desired outcome of cross-cultural communication,
transformational learning is not found to be determined by personality of the peopl e
involved, or their various learning styles (Kennedy, 1994). It is highly related to ego
development. To understand cross-cultural communication in a group setting, Elisabeth
Gilster (1996), in her dissertation, found that a researcher must first comprehend one-onone interactions, including knowledge of verbal and non-verbal language choices,
flexibility in timing, building rapport, and an understanding of what cultural clues might
constitute an implied contract. Trust is a critical predictor of success however, knowledge
of communication strategies and techniques are highly valued.
Need for closure (NFC) is a critical element in all interrelationships, and is
especially significant in cross-cultural communication (Barak, 1997). Ambiguous and
fast changing information are a potential source of misunderstanding. Need for resolution
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of issues through immediate action can cloud accurate assessment of situations and those
actions are commonly driven by the cultural frame of reference.
The critical elements that surfaced through analysis of Karen Thomas (1980) and
Elisabeth Gilster (1996) are focusing on the desired outcomes of cross-cultural
communication; assuring clarity of mission for the cross-cultural group; and recognizing
the personal need for closure by the group members.
Contrary to what many theorists believe (Morrison, Conway, & Borden, 1994), it
is shortsighted to believe that a "cook-book approach" to cross-cultural communication
can be devised. Current, standard cross-cultural training tends to run the risk of
subjecting the practitioner to committing unconscious stereotyping, when we really want
to promote knowledge and understanding. Communication is acutely sensitive to context
and situation. Trying to make one set of communication rules apply to all settings can be
self-defeating.
A new emphasis is probably in order. Focusing on commonality of needs, rather
than “one-size fits all” cultural rules, will respect all the research on cultural context,
while addressing the need to communicate.

Cross-Cultural Issues
Cross-cultural issues arise in the business world at the managerial level, simply
because companies with branches in different countries organize their daily business
differently. Two of the major differences are (Hofstede, 1991):
1.

Relative hierarchy of departments: The relative power of the various

departments within a corporation is often a function of the country where the facility is
located. For example, Richard Lewis (2001) says that manufacturing departments of
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German-based companies, because o f their judgement of their ability to make the
product, have influence over marketing and sales. In the U.S. it is usually the opposite,
because of their desire to satisfy a customer need.
2.

Sharing of information: Lewis says that Departments within a German

company are highly compartmentalized. Information flows downward. There is little
sharing of information within a hierarchical level across departments (Lewis, 2001).
The broad cultural diversity represented by such widespread operations will no
doubt hold implications for management and firm performance. Potential drawbacks to
transnational cultural diversity include "conflict, a lack of cohesion, misunderstanding
between diverse groups, parochialism, negative political activity, and poor organizational
performance" (Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1993, p. 177).
Due to cultural conditioning, managers from distinct cultures simply perceive,
interpret, and evaluate behaviors differently (Adler, 1997; Yasin, 1996), which creates
friction in the multi national corporation (MNC). Though too little conflict can be just as
dysfunctional as too much (Hambrick, 1995), culturally related firms can reduce the
degree of this type of diversity to a manageable level. They are able to exploit
management knowledge because of compatible thinking between international divisions,
whereas culturally diverse firms cannot transfer expertise since it is either inappropriate
to disparate markets or incompatible with host country management.
The strategy formulation process of culturally diverse global firms may suffer
because the dominant logic o f the various units is likely to be incongruent. Walsh and
Ungson (1991) recognize that "culture embodies past experience that can be useful for
dealing with the future" (p. 63). Culture thus serves as a "retention facility" for
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organizational memory, which guides firm decision-making. This is likely to thwart
effective communication and consensus among strategic decision-makers.
While firm strategy tends to be conditioned by culture, the implementation of that
strategy is often similarly directed. Among other concerns, successful implementation
hinges upon the appropriate design of an organization's structure (Dougherty & Corse,
1995; MacDuffie, 1999). The global firm maybe tempted to design its international units
to mirror the structure of the home division to maintain efficiency, but this is not
expedient when cultures differ too much to support the transfer (Morrison, Ricks, &
Roth, 1991). Snodgrass and Sekaran (1989) point out that the number of levels in the
hierarchy should match the power distance of the culture. Low power-distance
individuals, such as the United States, may reject a tall structure because they are too far
removed from decision-making authority, while high power distance individuals, such as
Germany, respond favorably to such an arrangement (Hofstede, 1980).

Cultural Markers
Richard D. Lewis, in his book When Cultures Collide (2001), defines cultural
dimensions in a different way. He contends that the national and regional cultures of the
world can be generally classified into three groups:
1.

Linear-Active: Members of these cultures are task-oriented, highly organized

planners. They are introverted, quiet, patient and like to mind their own business.
Timetables and schedules rule their life. They rarely interrupt and dislike losing face.
Some examples of linear-active cultures are Germans, Swiss, Austrians, Scandinavians,
and Caucasian Americans.
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2. Multi-Active: These cultures are people-oriented and are extroverted. Time has
a low priority. They will tend to be late to and over-run meetings, both social and
professional. They are apt to change plans abruptly. They tend to interrupt and confront
emotionally. Some examples of multi-active cultures are Spanish, southern Italians and
many Mediterranean cultures.
3. Reactive: These cultures are similar to the linear-active cultures, with some
exceptions. They will take statements as promises and adapt to their partner's timetable.
Where linear-active cultures are job-oriented, reactive cultures are people oriented. Some
examples of reactive cultures are Japan, China, Turkey, and Finland.
Edward T. Hall (1976) thought of culture as a system for creating, sending,
storing, and processing information. He believes that two forms of information guide
humans:
In Manifest Culture, communication is either verbal or written. Both words and
numbers are used in the process. Hall says that this form of interaction represents only
about 10% of all communication that occurs. Words and sentences have different
meanings depending on the context in which they are embedded. The rules vary from
culture to culture. A low context message assumes that the other person or group has a
limited level o f knowledge about the subject discussed and requires explicit
communication. An example might be an instance where a highly qualified college
English instructor is asked to manage a college bookstore. They would probably need
explicit instruction in inventory management and financial reporting.
A high context message assumes that the other person or group has a high level of
knowledge about the subject discussed and requires only implicit communication. An
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example could be where an automotive electronic engineer had previously been
responsible for the automotive entertainment systems (such as radios, CD players, stereo
speakers) and is now assigned to engine electronics. The person instructing could assume
that the engineer understood broad electronic principles and would now only need
specific instruction in the unique parts of the system that manages the running of the
engine.
In Tacit-acquired culture, communication is based on practices and solutions to
problems from past experiences of everyday life. This type of communication is highly
situational and operates according to rules where an individual is not aware of the
process. An example would be where a person grew up from childhood in an
environment where people were not trustworthy. As an adult, that person isn’t aware that
they use non-verbal behaviors that say that communicates a lack of trust. Non-verbal
communication is responsible for the greatest distortions in understanding between
people. Hall believes that this interaction represents about 90% of all communication that
occurs but is largely over-looked in the world of business.
Edward Hall (1973) also considered time as a kind of language or
communication. He says that time is not universal, that different time systems exist
around the world. He defines two basic time systems:
1. Monochronic time means paying attention to and doing only one thing at a
time. Time is therefore linear and time is divided into segments. Hall calls this M-Time.
2. Polychronic time means being involved with many things at once. Hall calls
this P-Time.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
Both M-Time and P-Time systems have their strengths and weaknesses. M-Time
stresses adherence to a schedule. It dominates the official worlds of government and big
business and creates big, centralized bureaucracies. P-Time stresses the involvement of
people and completion of transactions rather than adherence to a schedule. Their
successes are highly situational.
Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Tumer (2001) look at culture from the
aspect o f how "problem solving" occurs. They define culture as "the way a group of
people solve problems and reconcile dilemmas" (p. 32).
Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer contend that culture goes back to the very
beginning of human existence. They say that early humans had to adapt to their
environment or parish. Individual human beings eventually realized that by banding
together in “tribes” of people, they could more thoroughly manage their environment.
Because different groups were located in different regions of the globe, their
environments called for different solutions for survival.
In today’s world, Trompenaars and Hampden-T umer (2001) apply the same
principles to modem society. Whereas survival was once the target, success is now the
common goal. They believe that problem solving achieves that success.
Today, they contend that the nature of “tribes” has changed. Ancient man was
constrained by geography. Groups with common goals or interests are now the “tribes”
of modem man and they exist in a hierarchy. At the top of this hierarchy are national
interests, followed by regional interests, organizational interests, professional interests,
and personal values.
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Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer define seven value dimensions that shape how
a culture approaches problem solving:
1. Universalism versus Particularism: Universalism stresses standardization and
rules. Particularism stresses adaptability to circumstances.
2. Communitarianism versus Individualism: Do people consider themselves as
individuals or part of a group?
3. Neutral versus Emotional: Do people contain their emotions or express them
freely?
4. Defuse versus Specific: Do people see their life as segments, each unique
unto itself or do they see their life segments as parts of a whole?
5. Achievement versus Ascription: Do people value social position or do they
value performance?
6. Human-time relationship: Do people value short-term or long-term success?
7. Human-nature relationship: Do people view themselves as part of nature or
as masters of nature?
This study uses focus group output to understand first how problem solving
occurs within the population of the study. Focus group data are then evaluated against
value dimensions, in order to understand the cultural markers that drive these value
dimensions.
Geert Hofstede developed national culture theory over 20 years ago, using the
responses of IBM middle managers in 53 countries to generate a cultural profile for each
country. Hofstede (1980) found differences existed in four dimensions that were typical
for each country. These dimensions are:
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1. Power distance, which he defines as the extent to which the less powerful
accept power distributed unequally.
2. Individualism, which can be interpreted as whether the society values the
good of the few or the good of the many
3. Masculinity, which is identified as the extent to which social gender roles are
distinct within a society
4. Uncertainty avoidance, which he defines as the extent to which a society feels
threatened by the unknown
Hofstede (1980) cautions that one cannot predict individual behavior using his
research. The unit o f analysis is the countrywide level, and thus predictions can only be
made at that level. He feels that researchers run the risk of making two types of errors
when referring to his findings, using data collected countrywide to predict individual
behavior and using research correlated at the individual level to explain countrywide
data.

German and American Cultural Markers
In German culture, work relationships are strongly influenced by the medieval
guild system wherein the engineer and the Meister (often an engineer himself) fill hero
roles (Hofstede, 1998). In such a system, the worker is a highly trained individual whose
well-developed skill, based on training in the apprentice system, establishes his/her
expertise and hierarchical position in the production process. German workers expect,
however, the Meister to be the ultimate expert in resolving problems and to give orders
when needed (Hofstede, 1998). In such an expert-worker environment, compliance is
usually preferred over consensus, and employees show a strong deference to authority.
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Consequently, teams are regarded only as loosely knit groups of individuals with strong
expertise and clearly defined roles that are respected (Mole, 1992). German emphasis on
craftsmanship and its unique and non-standardized approach to production meant that
managers communicated very little with workers and did not interfere with work
processes.
Power in the German organization is hidden behind a functionalistic corporate
hierarchy that conforms conveniently to Germans' distaste for non-conformity and
otherness. From these characteristics results a "professional bureaucracy" (Hofstede,
1997), an "oligarchic power structure" (Mole, 1992). Senior managers, for the most part,
engage in planning with predominantly "top-down" decisions, information-sharing on a
need-to-know-basis, and rather distant supervisor-subordinate relationships. Hofstede,
moreover, found a rather high score on his uncertainty avoidance dimension but a higher
score on Collectivism than in the U.S. (Hofstede, 1997, 2001). This reliance on
uncertainty can be explained through the Meister system. The expert knows his
boundaries, he does not take risks beyond what is reasonable and he is concerned with
proper order. Security and esteem, therefore, are the supreme motivators in German
organizations (Hofstede, 1997).
The majority of German automobile manufacturers follow a hybrid model
originally developed by North American-Japanese transplants characterized as having
Taylorized group work systems (Roth, 1997). Thus, German firms’ production, and
assembly systems achieve high levels of performance through workers groups. These
workers groups have narrow, standardized, belt-dependent, and expert-led work patterns.
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American culture can be described as a pro-active, and can do orientation with a
certain explicitness, directness, and informality in superior-subordinate relationships. It
rests, moreover, on individualism and achievement -coupled with the belief that anything
is possible (Stewart & Bennett, 1991). This results in a strong work ethic (rooted in the
Protestant ethic) that sometimes ends in obsession with work (Hall & Hall, 1990) to the
detriment of family issues. As a parallel to the individualist ethos, the pressure to be a
team player is very tangible in U.S. organizations; yet, to be a team-player means that
whole-hearted commitment to a course of action is expected, not consensus (Mole, 1992).
Outsiders tend to observe that Americans usually do one thing at a time. This not only
makes a good basis for Taylorized production systems, but also results in a
"monochronistic calm" (Hall & Hall, 1990) that gives them the ability to "seek orders
from the situation" (Hofstede, 1997) which makes them appear pragmatic and flexible.
The culture of pragmatism is goal-oriented rather than problem-focused, and is short-term
in orientation with an elaborate division of labor (Bleicher, 1993). Getting things done,
which can result in risk-taking, thus drives Americans, confirming Hofstede's findings of
rather low uncertainty avoidance. Products and services are sometimes put in distribution,
even if they are not yet fully thought out, as, for example, the German expert culture
would demand.
Of particular interest to this study is the cultural profiles developed by Hofstede
for the countries of Germany and the United States, and the organizations that exist
within them. This study analyses focus group output to address the relationship it has to
these profiles.
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Hofstede’s (1980) analysis for Germany shows their emphasis on individualism,
masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance. Power distance and long-term orientation are
both ranked considerably lower than the others. This illustrates Germany’s belief in
equality and opportunity for each citizen, as well as its ability to change and adapt
rapidly. Most likely Germans are uncomfortable with uncertainty, and they are
individualistic. Germans like to set rules and stick with them. They do not feel
comfortable if they do not have fully control over the situation. Privacy is very important
to Germans. Most German managers have their own office and the door is always closed.
In general, Germans are very straightforward and they pride themselves on speaking their
mind. Punctuality is highly valued; schedules and meeting agendas are strictly followed.
Hofstede’s (1980) analysis for the United States is very similar to other World
Countries that have their heritage founded in Europe with strong ties to the British Isles.
Individualism ranks highest and is a significant factor in the life of U.S. Americans. The
low ranking of Long-term Orientation reflects a freedom in the culture from long-term
traditional commitments, which allows greater flexibility and the freedom to react
quickly to new opportunities.

Summary of Literature Review
Organizational culture can be defined as the deeper understanding of basic
assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of the organization. Schein (1991)
emphasizes that organizational cultures provide group members with a way of giving
meaning to their daily lives and setting guidelines and rules for how to behave. He further
suggests that culture ultimately reflects the group's effort to cope and leam and is the
residue of learning processes. He argues that organizational cultures are strongly
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influenced by shared experiences in the firm’s early history and that, once established and
taken for granted, the firm's basic assumptions are difficult to change.
The significance of organizational culture to the strategic change process is well
recognized. Culture has been shown to influence the ability of the organization to control
and cope with strategic change. Consequently, only if one appreciates the basic culture
and values that influence the key strategic elements can organizational strategy be
understood, implemented and changed.
March (1991) found that organizations that are good at learning from their
members have the most accurate understanding of a changing environmental reality.
Strong-culture organizations exhibit the opposite characteristics.
Significant cross-cultural problems exist within the international context. The
degree of transferability of management practices is a function of not only the
organizational culture, but of the culture of the host country. Partners with dissimilar
organizational cultures may expend time and energy to establish managerial practices and
routines to facilitate interaction, and may incur higher costs and more mistrust than
culturally similar organizations Corporate decision-makers in many firms have tended to
pay more attention to “strategic fit” than to organizational-integration issues.
Tropenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) say that in every7culture in the world,
authority, bureaucracy, validation, and accountability are experienced in different ways.
The problem is that words can take on different meanings as they move from culture to
culture. The managers of global organizations must maintain a delicate balance between
the need for standardization in organizational design and procedures, and local
characteristics o f the market, legislation, and the socio-political-cultural system. The
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silent forces of culture can operate a destructive process against centrally developed
methods that do not fit locally.
Because organizations are, in many ways, embedded in the larger society,
research on cultural differences of cross-national businesses should examine both
national and organizational cultures. Generally, past studies have not been concerned
with culture distance at both levels. These studies found that, whereas organizations from
different nations differ in fundamental values, organizations from the same nation differ
only in organizational practices. The studies further concluded that when both national
and organizational cultures are examined, the former should be examined in terms of
values, and the latter in terms of core organizational practices.
It is also widely accepted that organizational culture is nested in national culture.
Newman and Nollen (1996) reported that work units perform better when their
management practices are compatible with the national culture. They advocate that
management practices should be adapted to national culture for high performance.
Lane and Beamish (1990) state that the problems in IJVs often stem from the
influence of national culture on behavior and management systems. For example,
cooperation-generating mechanisms vary between individualist and collectivist cultures
because o f the differences in their motives (Chen et ah, 1998). In the context of IJVs,
diversity along each cultural characteristic can be instrumental in erecting significant
barriers to effective cooperation (Parkhe, 1993).
Communication underlies the effectiveness of coordinating exchange activities by
developing strong relationships, which results in improved performance (Kim, 1991).
Without effective inter-organizational communications, learning among partners is
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diminished and the long-run effectiveness of the relationship may be damaged.
Communication presupposes that there is a particular cultural framework that allows
"translation" of the meaning embedded within communication by the recipient to
maintain the true intent of the communication (Kim, 1991). When business partners
emanate from different cultures (national and organizational), the underlying cultural
inconsistencies in communication patterns create hurdles to the development of effective
global business relationships (Kim, 1991; Mohr & Nevin, 1990). Today, managers
continue to struggle with communication barriers in their international relationships. The
lack of a process to address communication issues presents a gap in the literature.
Hofstede and Bond (1988) have shown that the interaction of national and
organizational cultures can either facilitate or hinder communication effectiveness,
making these elements critical to consider when assessing communication in international
business relationships.
As no two national or organizational cultures are identical, inherent differences
necessitate a negotiation of communication and cultural protocols for the development of
a common communication environment (Kim, 1991). Through implicit adaptations, a
new communication environment that is unique to the firms in the relationship is
established. Casmir (1999) indicates that communication protocols, appropriateness of
strategies, monitoring, and communication feedback mechanisms are all dynamically
adjusted for successful communication to occur, thus suggesting not only communication
interaction, but also cultural interaction.
Effective communication is the central lifeline o f any organization. It is the
vehicle for driving change, shaping expectations and rallying workers around a core
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purpose and common message. When managing a geographically diverse workforce, one
that spans the world and crosses cultures, a strategic communication program can
strengthen the organization and support its success; the lack of one can be the linchpin of
organizational demise.
The success of business relationships over the long run are contingent on each
partner's investment in each network relationship as well as the partners' ability to
communicate effectively throughout the duration of the relationship (Mohr & Nevin,
1990). Relationship development is based on two distinct relational outcomes. First,
relationship efficiency focuses attention on reducing the direct transaction costs
associated with the exchange process among organizations and at the same time
increasing the volume of exchange. Second, stronger, more intimate relationships
increase the effectiveness of the inter-organizational network, thereby differentiating it
from less well-coordinated competitive networks.
National culture encompasses the values, beliefs, and assumptions that define a
distinct way of life of a group of people and is based on the fundamental concepts
imparted in early individual development (Hofstede, 1980, 1991). National culture not
only is deeply embedded in everyday life but also shapes how reality is interpreted in a
society, such as the distribution and use of power (Hofstede, 1980), relationship
definition (Trompenaars & Hampden-Tumer, 1994), and the appropriate roles and
obligations of individuals to individuals and individuals to organizations.
The greater the diversity among organizational cultures, the more difficulty
management will experience in communicating among these organizational units.
Differences among organizational cultures within a network of organizations can create
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conflict among member firms. This conflict will negatively affect communications and
may stimulate higher levels of resistance to change. Furthermore, even when a firm
operates within a similar national culture, the macroculture is subdivided into a myriad of
subcultures. Subculture differences are potential communication barriers to effective
network operations. Barriers to free and open communication with employees from
different subcultures, classes, or castes is to be expected and therefore must be taken into
consideration in the management of communications in host countries.
In her dissertation, Karen Thomas (1980) hypothesized that cross-cultural groups
are successful when the group shares a commitment that is highly relevant to each
member, encourages compromise on less important issues and clearly understands and
accepts the rules and procedures of the organization. Others would add that the
organizations’ mission and goals must be clear. Personal agendas could be at variance
with the official mission, or mission statements could run the risk o f not being in
harmony with the cultures involved (Budd, 1993).
Although it can be a desired outcome of cross-cultural communication,
transformational learning is not found to be determined by personality of the people
involved, or their various learning styles (Kennedy, 1994). It is highly related to ego
development. To understand cross-cultural communication in a group setting, Elisabeth
Gilster (1996), in her dissertation, found that a researcher must first comprehend one-onone interactions, including knowledge of verbal and non-verbal language choices,
flexibility in timing, building rapport, and an understanding of what cultural clues might
constitute an implied contract. Trust is a critical predictor o f success however, knowledge
of communication strategies and techniques are highly valued.
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The global firm may be tempted to design its international units to mirror the
structure of the home division to maintain efficiency, but this is not expedient when
cultures differ too much to support the transfer (Morrison et ah, 1991). Snodgrass and
Sekaran (1989) point out that the number of levels in the hierarchy should match the
power distance of the culture. Low power-distance individuals, such as the United States,
may reject a tall structure because they are too far removed from decision-making
authority, while high power distance individuals, such as Germany, respond favorably to
such an arrangement (Hofstede, 1980).
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This study was designed to identify cultural markers at work in a joint-venture
vehicle development project and to evaluate the perceived impact of these cultural markers
on the success of this project. The study group consisted of engineers from Global Motors
of the United States and from Baumgart AG of Germany. For all of the reasons stated
below, focus group methodology was selected for this study.

Research Design
This study utilizes focus group research. It comes under the heading of qualitative
research, and it combines elements of both interviewing and participant observation
(Patton, 1987). I chose focus group methodology because the main purpose of focus group
research is to draw out participants’ attitudes, feelings, beliefs and experiences where other
research methods would not. These attitudes, feelings, beliefs and experiences may be
partially independent of a group setting, but are more likely to be revealed in the
interaction o f a group setting. Focus groups provoke a multiplicity of views and emotional
contexts. They are particularly useful when there are power differences between the
participants (Morgan & Krueger, 1993). They can be used at the preliminary stages o f a
study, during a study, or after a study is complete. They can be used in their own right, or
as a complement to other methods.
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This strategy has the' advantage of getting reactions from a relatively wide range of
participants in a relatively short time. In a complementary fashion, focus group studies
have used follow-up interviews with individual participants to explore specific opinions
and experiences in more depth, as well as to produce narratives that address the continuity
of personal experiences over time (Kitzinger, 1994). This strategy has the advantage of
first Identifying a range of experiences and perspectives, then drawing from that pool to
add more depth where needed. Thus, depending on the varied needs that a qualitative study
has for breadth and depth, there is little difficulty in combining individual and group
interviews.
Interaction is the crucial feature of focus groups. Participants highlight their views
of the world and their values and beliefs. They ask questions of each other and reconsider
their own understandings (Kitzinger, 1994). Participant comments may become self
contradictory. In other words, comments that are made later in the session may actually
contradict what the same person said earlier. Through introspection and retrospection,
participants will often change their views, once they have an opportunity to reflect upon
other participant comments. They elicit information in a way that allows researchers to
discover relative importance (Morgan, 1992). The gap between what people say and what
they do can be better understood. The opportunity to be valued as experts and to be given
the chance to work collaboratively with researchers can be empowering to the group
(Kitzinger, 1994). Trust develops, and then the group will strive to work together as a unit,
rather than individuals (Kitzinger, 1995). Participants expand later on experiences
recounted earlier, placing this experience in the context of another’s.
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The definition of focus groups has three essential components (Patton, 1986):
1. First, focus groups are a research method devoted to data collection.
2. Second, focus groups identify the interaction that occurs in a group discussion
as the source of the data.
3. Third, focus groups acknowledge the researcher's active role in creating the
group discussion for data collection purposes.
The recommended number of people in a focus group is usually 6 to 10
(Macintosh, 1982), but some researchers have used up to 15 people (Goss & Leinbach,
1996) or as few as 4 (Kitzinger, 1995). The number of groups can vary. Some studies use
only one meeting with each of several focus groups (Burgess, 1996); others meet several
times. The number of open-ended questions presented can be as few as 6 (Krueger, 1988),
but should be no more than 12 (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990).
The most common rule of thumb is that most projects consist of four to six focus
groups. The typical justification for this range is that the data become "saturated" and little
new information emerges after the first few groups, so moderators can predict what
participants will say even before they say it (Zeller, 1993).
Fern's (1982) work on the relative productivity of individual interviews and focus
groups was one of the very few methodological studies that involved a head-to-head
comparison between the two methods. Using an "idea generation" task, Fern compared
focus groups to an equivalent number o f aggregated responses from individual interviews
(i.e., "nominal groups"). He determined that each focus group participant produced only
60% to 70% as many ideas as they would have in an individual interview. He also had
raters judge the quality o f ideas from the two methods, and again an advantage appeared
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for individual interviews. These results clearly argue against the notion that focus groups
have a "synergy" that makes them more productive than an equivalent number of
individual interviews. Instead, the real issue may well be the relative efficiency of the two
methods for any given project. For example, Fern's results suggest that two eight-person
focus groups would produce as many ideas as 10 individual interviews. As Crabtree,
Yanoshik, Miller, and O’Connor (1993) have pointed out, however, a number of logistical
factors, such as location of the interviews, the mobility of the participants, and the
flexibility of their schedules would determine which study would actually be easier to
accomplish. Kitzinger (1994) asserted that the opportunity to be valued as experts and to
be given the chance to work collaboratively may produce a slightly smaller number of
ideas but the later clarity and usability o f the ideas is a higher percentage.
One benefit of comparing focus groups to other methods is a more sophisticated
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of focus groups. Comparisons to other
methods have led to the conclusion that the real strength of focus groups is not simply in
exploring what people have to say, but in providing insights into the sources of complex
behaviors and motivations (Morgan & Krueger, 1993).
Morgan and Krueger (1993) also argued that the advantages of focus groups for
investigating complex behaviors and motivations were a direct outcome of the interaction
in focus groups, which has been termed "the group effect" (Carey, 1994; Carey & Smith,
1994). An emphasis on the specific kinds of interactions that occur in focus groups is also
an improvement over vague assertions that "synergy" is one of their strengths. What makes
the discussion in focus groups more than the sum of separate individual interviews is the
fact that the participants both query each other and explain themselves to each other. As
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Morgan and Krueger (1993) have also emphasized, such interaction offers valuable data on
the extent of consensus and diversity among the participants. This ability to observe the
extent and nature of interviewees' agreement and disagreement is a unique strength of
focus groups. A further strength comes from the researcher's ability to ask the participants
themselves for comparisons among their experiences and views, rather than aggregating
individual data in order to speculate about whether or why the interviewees differ. Because
group interaction requires mutual self-disclosure, it is undeniable that some topics will be
unacceptable for discussion among some categories of research participants.

The Role of the Facilitator/Moderator in Focus Groups
It is extremely important in focus group research to allow and promote the free
flow of ideas. The facilitator/moderator must strive to capture the essence of each and
every comment made during the focus group session. The temptation to make assumptions
or categorizations must be avoided until well after the meeting has taken place.
The presence of a facilitator/moderator is one of the most striking features of focus
groups. Groups in which the facilitator/moderator exercises a higher degree of control are
termed "more structured," and Morgan (1992) has called attention to two senses in which a
group can be more structured. First, it can be more structured with regard to asking
questions, so that the moderator controls what topics are discussed. Second, it can be more
structured with regard to managing group dynamics, so that the moderator controls the way
that the participants interact (e.g., trying to get everyone to participate equally in the
discussion). Both o f these aspects of moderator involvement can be elements of the
research design. A less structured discussion means that the group can pursue its own
interests, while a more stmctured approach means that the facilitator/moderator imposes
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the researcher's interests (as embodied in the questions that guide the discussion). A key
factor that makes groups more or less structured is simply the number of questions. In this
study, the number of questions was limited for three reasons:
1. To directly address the research questions
2. To surface any other issues or questions
3. To encourage participation.
In managing group dynamics, a less structured approach allows participants to talk
as much or as little as they please, while a more structured approach means that the
moderator will encourage those who might otherwise say little and limit those who might
otherwise dominate the discussion. Although most marketing approaches to focus groups
(Greenbaum, 1993) have typically advocated a more structured control of group dynamics,
many social science approaches have explicitly favored a less directive style of
interviewing (Krueger, 1994).
In general, most researchers prefer research designs with high levels of moderator
involvement that impose more structure with regard to both asking questions and
managing group dynamics. However, my study was a mixture of tight and loose structure.
I wanted to first address the research questions, but I also felt that by moving to a lose
structure, I could encourage the participants began to “take ownership” of their roles. I
wanted them to begin to look deeper into their own positions and challenge themselves.
Morgan (1988) has suggested that this type of approach reflects a difference
between the marketing goal of answering questions from an audience o f paying customers
and the social science goal of generating new knowledge for an audience of peer
reviewers. To the extent that this broad generalization does hold, it is a nice illustration of
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the general principle that research designs should follow from research goals. This
conclusion, that approaches to moderating should be linked to research goals, is strongly
supported by one of the few instances of systematic research that evaluates differences in
moderator style (Morgan, 1992). Further, it implies that arguments about whether
moderators should use a more or less structured approach are meaningless unless one
specifies the goals of the research.
In considering the set of issues involved in designing focus group research, it is
useful to distinguish between decisions that apply to the research study as a whole and
those that apply to the conduct of a particular group within the study. For the research
study as a whole, standardization addresses the extent to which the identical questions and
procedures are used in every group. At one extreme would be an emphasis on "emergence"
that lets the questions and procedures shift from group to group in order to take advantage
of what has been learned in previous groups. At the other extreme, a project could begin by
determining a fixed set of questions and procedures that would apply throughout.
This study first used a specific set of questions to address the specific research
and then provided ample opportunity to explore other topics through free-formed
discussion.
Within these focus groups, the facilitator/moderator must provoke debate, draw out
differences, and look for shades of meaning. As the facilitator/moderator, I assumed a
sequence of roles in a specific order (Morgan, King, & Krueger, 1997):
1.

Role 1, stage 1: Seeker of Wisdom / Enlightened Novice: I was there to attain

understanding, insight, and wisdom. I assumed that the participants had the wisdom, and, if
I asked the right question, they would share that wisdom. Under the conditions of this
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study, I had to suppress any pre-conceived ideas that he holds. Each participant’s ideas
were good ones. I asked for more and more details. As 1 gained enlightenment, that
knowledge provoked further questions.
2. Role 2, stage 2: Challenger / Referee: When I felt that the group had attained a
level o f trust, I asked the participants to explain, amplify and justify their ideas and actions.
Occasionally, I pitted one participant against another who seemed to have an opposing
point o f view. The challenge was to avoid alienating the participants. Successful challenges
can sometimes surface better understanding. To avoid polarization of the group, I also
became the referee. Each person was allowed to present his or her view without derision or
conflict.
3. Role 3, stage 3: The paperhanger: The interviewer becomes the writer. I kept
the focus of the group on the project at hand by writing questions on a large flip chart and
recording answers that the group provided to the question. When these pages were filled
with comments, they were then taped to the wall for all to see. The strategy has several
advantages. It promotes the group to stay on focus and it was additional data was later used
in analysis.
4. Role 4, stage 4: Therapist: The therapist’s role is to seek information on
psychological motivation or why they think the way they do. I pressed the participant to
explain some aspects o f his behavior or past actions as a clue to greater insight by asking
"Why is that?" or "Why did you do/think that?" The object was to provoke more insight.
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Qualitative Research
As previously mentioned, focus groups are a type of qualitative research.
According to Patton (1987), qualitative research is
an effort to understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular context
and the interactions there. This understanding is an end to itself, so that is not
attempting to predict what may happen in the future necessarily, but to understand
the nature of that setting, what it means for participants to be in that setting, what
their lives are like, what’s going on for them, what their meanings are, what the
world looks like in that particular setting, (p. 232)
In all research, the researcher must clearly identify the methodology employed in
the study and demonstrate its consistency with the study's philosophical base. The differing
philosophical traditions that orient qualitative studies often suggest different
methodologies. For example, critical studies, based on particular value premises, may
require different methods from a study of the same content area. Methodological
considerations include the nature of the sample, data collection methods, methods of
analysis, and methods o f data presentation.
Researchers should specify the nature of the study sample and the rationale for its
selection within the context o f study objectives. Creating a detailed portrayal of a single
experience may require only a few key informants, but developing a grounded theory
about a life event will require participants with a range of views and experiences. The
researcher must actively seek out and include participants who can challenge preliminary
theories. Clearly, differences in study philosophy will also lead to different sampling
decisions; therefore, researchers must align their sample and sampling methods with their
selected research paradigm. This study was a portrayal of a single event, a joint-venture
vehicle development project, and was not meant to convey a grounded experience.
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Seeking out, reporting, and weighing contradictory evidence are important in
establishing the transferability of research findings. Research intended to lead to the
development of general theories applicable across persons and settings requires an analysis
of alternative viewpoints and conclusions. Research claiming to establish the
transferability of findings or recommendations from one setting to another requires a
sample of the appropriate size and composition.
Transferability describes the applicability of findings and conclusions derived from
one context to a second context (Leininger, 1994). As previously noted, the transferability
of results is often important to the consumers of qualitative studies. A notable limitation of
many qualitative studies is the lack of explicit analysis of the transferability of study
findings. Without guidance from the researcher, consumers of such reports are left to
formulate their own views about the transferability of the findings.
As I reflected earlier in this chapter, researchers should detail the means of data
collection employed in their research. A central issue in the credibility of any study is how
and under what conditions the research data are collected. Although the literature reveals
several approaches to collecting qualitative research data, the researcher should ensure that
the method selected is fully consistent with the study philosophy and objectives. My use of
focus group methodology for this purpose is discussed earlier.
Most qualitative researchers employ flexible data collection methods that evolve to
meet unexpected data and sources (Anastas & MacDonald, 1994), which is a great asset in
understanding-oriented research. For example, qualitative evaluation may employ
interviews, record reviews, reviews of published materials about a program (such as annual
reports and funding submissions), and participant observation (Patton, 1987).
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Facilitator/moderator observation and reflection was noted as part of the data gathering
from focus group transcripts. In this study, the transcripts served as texts, and participant
observation data allow a check of how the texts correspond to enacted programs, staff
member behaviors, and reactions. In this sense, data collection and analysis work in
tandem. Texts should be permanent records that permit others to confirm findings and
interpretations. Detailing how and what data are collected is vital to the study's coherence
and completeness.
Another challenge facing qualitative researchers is to report enough data to
illustrate how they formulated codes. Leininger (1994) notes that claims of recurrent
patterns in qualitative data need documentation. My study met or exceeded the guidelines
for the recommended number of people in a focus group (Macintosh, 1982), the number of
groups (Burgess, 1996), the number of open-ended questions (Krueger, 1988), and the
number of sessions held (Zeller, 1973).
Because coding summarizes participants' views and experiences, researchers should
describe what they include in and exclude from key codes. The coding used for this study
is a set of cultural markers developed from the research of Hall (1973), Hofstede (1980)
and Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001).
Researchers should clearly identify their methods o f data analysis and ensure these
are consistent with the study philosophy and objectives. There are well-elaborated methods
of data analysis applicable to several forms of qualitative research. Therefore, researchers
should offer ample information about coding procedures and other aspects of data analysis
within a qualitative research report. The procedures used for coding are well documented
later in this chapter.
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Other well-developed data analysis methodologies are found in narrative analysis
(Riessman, 1993), discourse analysis (Nye, 1994; Sherman, 1994), applied ethnography
(Van Maanen, 1995), and utilization-focused evaluation (Patton, 1986, 1987). Until the
analytic methods of these and other qualitative research approaches are taught in schools of
social work, researchers must extensively describe their data analysis methods in reports.
Data analysis methodologies differ among investigators of critical studies. Cohen
and Omery (1994) differentiate between descriptive and interpretive schools of the study
of phenomenology. Detailed descriptions of either phenomenologic method relevant to
human services are quite rare. Eidetic phenomenological studies offer illuminating
description, but may offer little in the way of an analytic framework. This emphasis may
require readers to provide the analysis and sort out implications for practice or policy.
In critical studies, data analysis centers on the application of an often preestablished interpretive standard to the collected data. This interpretive standard is often a
value perspective, and shapes the interpretation of the data. Such critical studies can offer
important and transformative insights into social events, allowing readers to understand the
unarticulated value premises implicit in everyday conduct. However, critical studies must
explicitly consider available evidence that may contradict the chosen value frame.
Therefore, research reports of critical studies must analyze alternative interpretations of
data and show them to be limited. Such efforts show the researcher's acknowledgment of
potential biases and enhance the overall credibility of critical studies.
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Interpretive C riteria
General interpretive criteria exist for assessing data analysis in qualitative studies
(Leininger, 1994; Reid, 1994). The application of these criteria varies across philosophical
schools o f qualitative research. Four widely reported criteria are offered here, all of which
are applicable across the range of qualitative approaches. These interpretive criteria refer
broadly to the methods of capturing and conveying the experiences and meanings of
research participants.
Because understanding, rather than prediction or causal inference, is typically the
goal of qualitative research, researchers seek uniqueness, authenticity, and
revelation. In addition, qualitative researchers must maintain accuracy to local,
subjective meanings in the processes of data coding and summarizing results for
publication, and reduce the potential for bias via self-awareness, efforts to find
contradictory data, and efforts to develop alternative interpretations. (Leininger,
1994, p. 101)
Credibility/Believability is the first interpretive criterion (Reid, 1994). Data and
analysis must fully convey what local participants know or experience within their local
context (Leininger, 1994), and interpretations must be authentic and accurate to the
descriptions of the primary participants. (I did a validation of this requirement by
reviewing the findings of this research at a combined teleconference between Global
Motors and Baumgart AG at the conclusion of my study.) The experiences of observers
and other forms of data offer external perspectives that may add to our understandings and
interpretations of internal, subjective knowledge, creating a credible, cumulative whole.
The whole, as presented to the reader, must be believable and reflect the participant's
world, complemented but not reshaped by the researcher's interpretations and
summarization.
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As discussed previously, extensive reporting of raw data in the form of the
participant's own words or the researcher's descriptions of behavior establishes credibility
by allowing the reader to decide how accurately the researcher has summarized and
interpreted others' experiences, behaviors, and understandings.
The second interpretative criterion is placing meanings in context (Leininger, 1994;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Riessman, 1994). Describing and linking data to a context in which
the data were generated are strengths of qualitative research. Only within particular
contexts or settings do certain qualitative data gain meaning or reveal the participant's
understanding or perspective. Qualitative reports must convey the "local" perspective and
they must establish how such perspectives or interpretations are consistent with external
interpretations. Linking data to context and providing a sense of the wholeness of the
situation, event, or environment are central to the coherence and credibility of a qualitative
report. Readers can then assess the cogency of the analysis, the accuracy of the researcher's
interpretations o f meanings, and the transferability of findings. By describing the findings
at the final teleconference and allowing rebuttal, the study was validated as to context and
relationship.
The third interpretative criterion is confirmability, which refers to the researcher's
efforts to corroborate data and to challenge and/or affirm interpretation or theory (Reid,
1994). Multiple, repeated instances of some phenomena, obtained from direct observation
or reports from primary sources, enhance both credibility and confirmability. "Feedback
sessions" with participants to establish that research codes are accurate help confirm the
researcher's interpretation and enhance the study's overall credibility. This was also
accomplished by the final teleconference session.
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Qualitative research reports should describe the nature and extent of confirmatory
activities. Explicit description of the purposes, content, and extent of feedback sessions is
useful to the reader, as are descriptions of "audit trails" and other activities undertaken by
the researchers to confirm interpretations and aid credibility. When reports are specific in
this area, researchers establish a trail that allows others to understand and replicate the
original analysis.
The fourth interpretive criterion is completeness or saturation, which refers to the
comprehensiveness of both the data collection and analysis. With respect to data
collection, establishing saturation means asking participants to say a little more when they
claim to have said it all, and working on in the face of considerable repetition. With respect
to data analysis, this means reaching a point when the coding scheme is "saturated" and no
additional codes are needed to capture the participants' experiences and meanings. Striving
for saturation helps ensure that no data are omitted and that codes are comprehensive.
The relative importance of each of these interpretive criteria may vary with the
philosophical frame and objectives of a given study, but understanding-oriented studies
that employ interpretive analytic procedures should address each criterion to strengthen the
academic integrity of results and reports.

Researcher Bias
Explicitly identifying sources of potential researcher bias, including initial
expectations of study results, strengthens the credibility of qualitative reports (Hyde, 1994;
Reid, 1994). Bias in qualitative research refers to influences that impair complete or
accurate sampling, data collection, data interpretation, and reporting. Qualitative
researchers seek to limit bias through self-awareness; therefore, they should report any
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potential biases and note what content areas might be influenced. I admitted that I carried a
certain degree of bias because I had been a member of that joint-venture project team. As
such, I had some pre-conceived expectations of the findings. (These expectations were
later disproved.)

Population of the Study
One hundred and ten engineers received invitations by e-mail (see Appendix A) to
participate in this volunteer study, from which a group of 30 engineers accepted; 16 from
Baumgart AG and 14 from Global Motors. No attempt was made to evaluate reasons for
non-participation of the remaining members of the group.
I enlisted the assistance of Uz Wagemann, Systems Process Engineer at Baumgart
AG complex in Germany, in facilitating the focus groups at that location. Uz has
responsibility for human process design at Baumgart AG and, as such, is the person
directly trained and responsible for acting as a non-biased facilitator as his sole job
responsibility at Baumgart AG. He has received focus group training at the University of
Munich and also General Motors Institute. He has not only facilitated over 30 individual
focus group sessions in his own organization, but has served in the same capacity for more
than 10 supplier companies who deal with Baumgart AG. He also had the assignment of
integrating and standardizing Engineering Process Operations within the new global ’
structure, between Baumgart AG and Global Motors of North America.
I facilitated the focus group meetings at the Global Motors location in the United
States. I have received training in group dynamics and change management at Oakland
University, at Central Michigan University and at General Motors Institute. I have
facilitated 20 departmental and divisional process improvement and merger activities
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within the Global Motors Organization. I have facilitated a focus group team which
redefined and reorganized the administrative functions of a large local public school
system.

Procedure
Since the completion of the joint-venture project described in this study, many
members of the project team had been reassigned to new projects at new physical
locations. It was necessary to devise a methodology that took this into account.
I wanted to give each member of the project team equal opportunity to participate.
For that reason, I made arrangements for focus groups to take place both in Germany and
the United States. To allow for possible conflict in personal schedules, two focus groups
were held in each country. Participants could choose either focus group session. (As
previously mentioned in this chapter, the most common rule of thumb is that most projects
consist of four to six focus groups.) Zeller (1993) says that the data become "saturated"
and little new information emerges after the first few groups, so moderators can predict
what participants will say even before they say it.
Two weeks prior to the scheduled sessions, all past members of the project team
received an e-mail letter inviting them to participate and assuring them of anonymity
(Appendix A). One week prior to the sessions, they each received a reminder note in the
form of an internal e-mail. Twenty-seven percent of the project team chose to participate.
A discussion guide is a critical first step for the planning of focus groups. It is the
“script” that the facilitator will follow during the sessions, in order to ensure that attention
is placed on the topics he must explore. Uz and I used telephone and video conferencing to
work together in preparing our discussion guide before the first sessions. The discussion
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guide was structured in three main sections: Introduction: The participants were asked to
introduce themselves and give brief autobiographies. They shared personal stories about
their family, their education, and their current assignments. General questions: We asked
for some expansion and explanation of the details within their Introductions. Topic
questions: We developed questions that we hoped would provoke deeper discussion. After
we reviewed them with a total of 10 managers not directly involved with the joint-venture
project under study, the following ten questions were used. (As cited earlier in this chapter,
6 was recommended as the minimum number of questions, with a recommended a
maximum of 12.)
1. What is your home (or parent) organization?
2. What is your age?
3. How long have you been employed at your current company?
4. What degrees do you hold?
5. Is this the first j oint venture proj ect in which you participated?
6. When you first began this project, how did you view the potential for its’
success? Why did you feel this way?
7. How did you rate the success of this joint-venture project at its’ conclusion?
Why do you rate it this way?
8. At the end of this project, did your combined team review it’s experiences with
the idea of learning from mistakes?
9. What cultural markers did the team exhibit during this joint-venture
project?
10. Do you think any of these cultural markers influenced the success of
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this project? If yes, how?
The ongoing dialog during each focus group session was recorded for later
transcription, using two tape recorders located in different points in the room to ensure
complete data collection. In order to ensure anonymity, the facilitators served as
transcribers, assigning pseudonyms for each participant. In this study, this was
accomplished with 2 actions:
3. All of the proceeds were tape recorded, using two audio recorders at each
session. Two weeks later, these recordings were transcribed, providing a baseline of
information that was free of facilitator/moderator assumptions or categorizations.
4. The transcriptions were then reviewed and converted to individual statements
on individual index cards, one statement per card. At this point, the facilitator/moderated
added his comments relating to the theme of the statement and observations made.
Participants at both the German location and the U.S. location consisted of both
Germans and Americans. Fortunately, all of the participants from Germany are required to
learn English as a second language. Uz Wagemann, the facilitator in Germany, spoke both
languages fluently. Translation occurred as part of the facilitation and transcription
processes at the focus group sessions in Germany.

Data Transcription and Analysis
Merriam (1988) states, “Making sense out of the data involves consolidating,
reducing, and interpreting what people have said and what the researcher has seen and
read” (p. 178). Eisner (1998) suggests that “in seeking structural corroboration, we look for
recurrent behaviors or actions, those theme-like features of a situation that inspires
confidence that the events interpreted and appraised are not aberrant or exceptional, but
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rather characteristic of the situation” (p. 110). Tesch (1990) adds, “The basic procedure in
content analysis is to design categories that are relevant to the research purpose and to sort
all occurrences of relevant words or other recording units into these categories” (p. 87).
Data transcription is an integral process in the interpretation of language data.
Lapadat and Lindsey (1999) argue that, compared to more expedient approaches,
transcripts are better at facilitating audits of analytic decision points because they “preserve
the data in a more permanent, retrievable, examinable, and flexible manner” (p. 80). The
process o f doing transcription also promotes intense familiarity with the data, which leads
to methodological and theoretical thinking essential to the interpretation process. Verbatim
transcription serves the purpose of taking speech, which is heavily contextualized, within
its situational and social context, and capturing it into a static, manipulable form.

Data Coding
In general, qualitative data coding entails identification of the themes contained in
specific text passages or segments (Bernard, 1994; Gordon, 1992; Miles & Huberman,
1994). Themes may include beliefs, experiences, or opinions that the respondent was
trying to communicate in response to the interviewer's questions. Different respondents
may express the similar themes but state their ideas in different ways, or they may hold
entirely different views. The qualitative data coding process requires that researchers
accurately read and comprehend similarities and differences across various passages,
regardless o f the way respondents express themselves. Text passages containing identical
themes are coded the same way, and passages containing different themes receive different
codes. One o f the key elements in qualitative data analysis is the systematic coding of text
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Codes are the building blocks for theory or model building
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and the foundation o f a qualitative study. They embody the assumptions behind the
analysis.
The information collected from each focus group was considered raw data. As
facilitators, we analyzed content of the transcription, looking for trends, patterns, and a
way of reducing the data. Uz and I created categories by grouping content of the transcripts
by the subject matters discussed and the frequency of their occurrence, as suggested by
Eisner (1998) and Tesch (1990). We used a technique based upon a manufacturing process
analysis tool called Quality Function Deployment (QFD).

Quality Function Deployment
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) is actually a tool used by industry to develop
a disciplined approach for product and process planning. It begins by coming to a specific
understanding of who the customer is (there may be more than one). The customers for this
study are the management o f the organizations being studied. The objective is then to
understand what the customer requires from the process or product. This is called customer
requirements. To illustrate the concept of customer requirements, I would like to offer the
following example:
Let’s suppose that your business is managing a pizzeria. Your customer is all of the
people in your surrounding neighborhood. All of these people have different opinions of
what makes a good pizza. Some would like a thin crust, some thick. Some would like it
crisp, some chewy. Some would like tomato sauce to be the main taste; others would like
the main taste to be cheese. Some would like square pizza; others round. Some want meat,
some are vegetarians, etc. The first step in the QFD process is to define customer
requirements. The customer requirements for this study is to understand if there were
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cultural markers present in this joint-venture project team and whether or not they affected
the success of the project.
The second step in the QFD process is to define design requirements. These are the
standards by which a product or process is measured to determine degree of success (in our
pizzeria example, we might choose some combination of oven temperature, or time in the
oven, or equipment used, etc.) The design requirements for this study are the cultural
markers identified from the studies of Hall (1973), Hofstede (1980), and Trompenaars and
Hampden-Tumer (2001)
The third QFD step is to identify part characteristics observed. (In our pizzeria
example, this would be the number of times a pizza was chewy, or crusty, or thin, or thick,
or “tomatoey” or “cheesey” etc.) The part characteristics for this study are how many times
the engineers who worked on the project made comments that could be classified as
cultural markers.
The fourth QFD step is to group the part characteristics observed into logical
categories. (In our pizzeria example, we would want to know what things affect the
“cheweyness” of the pizza.) For the purpose of this study, the engineers’ comments were
grouped by related cultural markers.
For the purpose of this study, the use o f Quality Function Deployment stops here.
QFD step 5 begins taking the data discovered and developing a problem resolution plan.
QFD step 6 begins implementation of that problem resolution plan.
QFD works best when kept as simplified as possible. However, the act of
simplifying the QFD process can also cause the analysis process to be labor-intensive. We
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decided to use 3” x 5” index cards to capture each comment, only recording 1 comment per
card (Appendix B). On each card, we also included the following information:
1. Pseudonym of participant
2. P articipant ’s home organization
3. Site where session was held.
I decided to use Uz as another level of validity check by including him in the
analysis of the comment cards. We met on January 7, 2003, in the United States. We read
and discussed each card and agreed upon the themes of each comment, adding our
observations. Using a conference room table, we were able to create a large “grid”
consisting of columns of these cards, with each column consisting of comment cards
relating to a consistent theme. These themes were each recorded on their own individual
3” x 5” index card for the purpose of grouping cultural markers.
The headings identified were:
1. Individualism: Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) define seven value
dimensions. The second of those dimensions is named “Communitarianism versus
Individualism,” which they define as whether or not people consider themselves as
individuals or part of a group? Hofstede (1980) interprets individualism as whether the
society the good of the few or the good of the many.
2. Formality: Hofstede (1980) found differences existed in four dimensions that
were typical for each country. The first of these is “power distance” which he defines as
the extent to which the less powerful accept power distributed unequally. The greater the
power distance in an organization, the more formal the behavior.
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3. Risk Response: Hofstede (1980) defines “uncertainty avoidance” as the
extent to which a society feels threatened by the unknown. For example, he defines
Americans as being much more willing to “take a chance” than German people.
4. Results Orientation: Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) refer to the
value dimension of “imiversalism versus particularism” which stresses standardization of
processes versus results of the process.
5. Use of Time: Hall (1980) defines two basic time systems: Monochronic time
means paying attention to and doing only one thing at a time. Polychronic time means
being involved with many things at once.
6. Social Exchange: Trompenaars and Hampden-T umer (2001) in the value
dimension “universalism versus particularism” say that an individual needs rules from
which to operate. When there is none, they create them from their experience and they
might not be correct. “Neutral versus Emotional” assess whether or not a given group or
organization withholds emotions or express emotions freely.
7. Adaptability: Trompenaars and Hampden-T umer (2001) define culture as
“the way a group of people solve problems and reconcile dilemmas.” Their seven value
dimensions (as discussed in chapter 1) address adaptability.
8. Operating Authority: Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) in the value
dimension “Achievement versus Ascription” (which discusses performance authority vs.
position authority) asks if a group values social position or if they value performance.
The population of interest for my study was a group consisting of 14 engineers
from Global Motors North America and 16 engineers from Baumgart AG o f Germany. The
members of this group were volunteer representatives from a team of 110 engineers who
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had been formed for the purpose of designing, engineering, developing, and manufacturing
the first vehicle platform that was targeted for the global, worldwide market.
Data accumulated has to be organized into a manageable form. Miles and
Huberman (1994) described the first of their three elements of qualitative analysis as data
reduction. Data need to be condensed for the sake of manageability, and transformed so
that they may become intelligible in terms of the issues being addressed. As the researcher,
in consultation with Uz Wagemann, I decided which data would be singled out for
description. This involves deductive and inductive analysis. Initial categorizations are first
shaped by initial study questions, but as the researcher I must remain open to new
meanings discovered.

Data Validity
Early proposals for data validity criteria identified four issues to be addressed in
validation of quantitative data: internal validity; external validity; reliability; and
objectivity.
However, these issues could not be addressed well in qualitative research. Different
researchers recast these issues to meet those varying needs (Lincoln, 2001). Eisenhart and
Howe (1992) proposed these criteria:
1. Ensuring fit between research questions, data collection procedures, and
analytic techniques
2. Ensuring effective application of specific data collection and analytic
techniques
3. Being alert to and cognizant of prior knowledge
4. Being cognizant of value constraints
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5. Assessing comprehensiveness.
Creswell and Miilar (2000) identify eight verification procedures (a term they
prefer over validity). They believe that different procedures may be more appropriate for
different applications within qualitative research and they recommend that at least two of
the eight following procedures be employed in any given study:
1. Prolonged engagement and persistent observation: Another validity procedure
is for researchers to stay at the research site for a prolonged period of time. During
repeated observation, the researchers build trust with participants, find gatekeepers to
allow access to people and sites, establish rapport so that participants are comfortable
disclosing information, and reciprocate by giving back to people being studied.
2. Triangulation: Triangulation is a validity procedure where researchers search
for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or
categories in a study. The term comes from military navigation at sea where sailors
triangulated among different distant points to determine their ship's bearing.
3. Peer review or debriefing: A peer review or debriefing is the review of the data
and research process by someone who is familiar with the research or the phenomenon
being explored. A peer reviewer provides support, plays devil's advocate, challenges the
researchers' assumptions, pushes the researchers to the next step methodologically, and
asks hard questions about methods and interpretations (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
4. Negative case analysis: The researcher attempts to disprove findings, either
through self-criticism or consultation with experts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5. Clarifying researcher bias: This is the process whereby researchers report on
personal beliefs, values, and biases that may shape their inquiry. It is particularly important
for researchers to acknowledge and describe their entering beliefs and biases early in the
research process to allow readers to understand their positions, and then to bracket or
suspend those researcher biases as the study proceeds.
6. Member checks: It consists of taking data and interpretations back to the
participants in the study so that they can confirm the credibility of the information and
narrative account. With the lens focused on participants, the researchers systematically
check the data and the narrative account.
7. Thick description: The process of writing using thick description is to provide
as much detail as possible. It may involve describing a small slice of interaction,
experience, or action; locating individuals in specific situations; bringing a relationship or
an interaction alive between two or more persons; or providing a detailed rendering of how
people feel (Denzin, 1989). With this vivid detail, the researchers help readers understand
that the account is credible. Rich description also enables readers to make decisions about
the applicability of the findings to other settings or similar contexts.
8. External audits: The credibility of a study is established by turning to
individuals external to the project, such as auditors—formally brought into the study-or
readers who examine the narrative account and attest to its credibility. In establishing an
audit trail, researchers provide clear documentation of all research decisions and activities.
They may provide evidence o f the audit trail throughout the account or in the appendices.
Researchers may also use an external auditor to review their study.
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Method of Verification
In this study, measures were taken to ensure credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability as suggested by Lincoln and Guba (1985). This was how
I ensured these measures:
1. Triangulation: A different facilitator was used for the sessions held in Germany.
(The participant “mix” was consistent in all U.S. and German Sessions.)
2. Peer review or debriefing: I held sessions with my German facilitator to
examine consistency and verifiability of session interpretations for the U.S. and German
sites.
3. External audits: Processes, observations and outcomes were reviewed with
Dr. Jeffery Robbins, of Global Motors Research Labs, for accuracy.
4. Member checks: A teleconference between Global Motors United States and
Baumgart AG in Germany allowed all original participants the opportunity to view the
outcomes of the study and to validate the accuracy of the study.
5. Clarifying researcher bias: I addressed my potential researcher bias as a
member of the Global Motors group by asking that Baumgart AG use a facilitator from
their organization to facilitate the sessions in Germany. I also recognized that the findings
of the research were significantly different than my expectations of the research.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study was to examine perceived behaviors at work during the
joint vehicle development project between Global Motors North America and Baumgart
AG that were culturally based (cultural markers) and then investigate the effects of those
behaviors on the overall success of the joint venture project. The study group consisted of
engineers from Global Motors of the United States and engineers from Baumgart AG of
Germany. Focus group methodology was selected for this study.
Comparisons to other methods have led to the conclusion that the real strength of
focus groups is not simply in exploring what people have to say, but in providing insights
into the sources of complex behaviors and motivations (Morgan & Krueger, 1993). This
chapter presents characteristics of focus group members and the analysis of the focus
group output

Characteristics of Focus Group Participants
By holding focus group sessions at Global Motors in the United States and at
Baumgart AG in Germany, we were able to have participation from both organizations A
total of thirty engineers from the U.S. and Germany attended the four sessions. This
represented twenty-seven percent of all the engineers who worked on the project. A
mixture of both U.S. and German engineers participated in each session.
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Not surprisingly, the sessions held in the United States had more participants from
Global Motors than from Baumgart AG, by a rate of about two to one. Likewise, when
the sessions were held in Germany, Baumgart participants outnumber the Global Motors,
participants by about two to one (see Table 1). All sessions, whether in Germany or the
United States, consisted of a mixture of both German and American engineers

Table 1
Focus Group Participants

United States Sessions
M tg i
Mtg 2

Germany Sessions
Mtg 1
Mtg 2

Total By
Company

Global Motor
Engineers

6

4

2

2

14

Baumgart
Engineers

2

3

5

6

16

8

7

7

8

30

Total by
Mtg. Session
Note. Mtg = Meeting.

I then looked at the respective ages of the focus group participants, first within the
grouping of their parent organization, then within the context of the total combined
grouping of all of the participants. Table 2 shows that about 86% of the Global Motors
participants were under the age of 41 (12 people). Within the Baumgart AG group of
participants, 44% were under the age of 41 (7 people). This meant that, as a whole, the
Global Motors group was significantly younger than the Baumgart group. However, it is
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interesting to note that when considering the combined total participation from both
organizations, about 63% were under the age of 41 (19 people) and about 37% percent
were 41 or older (11 people).

Table 2
Focus Group Participants by Age
Global Motors
Age

People

25-30
31-35
36-40
41-45
45-50
51-65

J

4
5
0

1
1

14

Totals

Percentage

Baumgart AG
People

Percentage

1

6.25
18.75
18.75
12.50
25.00
18.75

21.4
28.6
35.7
0.0
7.1
7.1
100.00

3
3
2

4
3
16

100.00

Seniority
Seniority, for the purpose of this study, is defined as the amount of time spent
working for the current employer. Table 3 shows a comparison of seniority across
Baumgart AG and Global Motors participants.
There were about twice as many Baugart participants with over 25 years’
seniority as there were Global Motors participants with over 25 years’ seniority.
Baumgart had no volunteers with less than 11 years of seniority, whereas about 21% of
the Global Motors volunteers had less than 11 years.
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T ab le 3

Frequency o f Participants by Seniority Grouping
Global Motors
Senioritv
0-5 yrs
6-10 yrs
11-15 yrs
16-20 yrs
21-25 yrs
26-30 yrs
31-35 yrs
over 35
Totals

Number
2
1
1
o

2
3
1
1
14

Baum gart AG
Number Percentage

Percentage
14.3
7.1
7.1
21.4
14.3
21.4
7.1
7.1

0
0
1
2
3
3
4
3

0.00
0.00
6.25
12.5
18.75
18.75
25.00
18.75

100.00

16

100.00

The participants were also asked to indicate their level of formal education. A
comparison of the two groups in Table 4 shows that 56% of the Baumgart group held
graduate degrees, as compared to 14% of the Global Motors group.

Table 4
Focus Group Participants by Educational Level

Educational Level

Global Motors

Baumgart AG

People Percentage

People Percentage

Bachelor

12

85.7

7

43.75

Graduate

2

14.3

9

56.25

16

100.0

16

100.00

Totals
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In summary, about 63% of the total combined group was under the age of 41
years. Thirty-seven percent of the total group held graduate or post-graduate degrees, and
about 50% had been with the company 25 or more years. When comparing the total
group by its parent organizations, the data show that the Global Motors group was
significantly younger, had less seniority and had less graduate education.

Discussion Questions
Due to the nature and structure of our focus group sessions, each session began
with a set of general discussion questions; the first being “Is this the first joint-venture
project in which you participated? ” Eighty-one percent indicated they had no prior
experience with joint-venture projects. Nineteen percent indicated that they had.
The question was then asked, “When you first began this project, how did you feel
about the potential fo r its success? ” This question attempted to draw out evidence of any
pre-formed ideas. Each person in each focus group session was asked this question in the
form a Likert scale, to rate their answers as; strongly negative (1 point), negative (2
points), neutral (3 points), positive (4 points), or strongly positive (5 points). The result
of this question is shown in Table 5.

Table 5
Potential for Success, as Perceived at Project Start
U.S. Sessions
German Sessions
Mt2 1 Mtg 2
Mtg 1 Mtg 2
Strongly Negative
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Strongly Positive
Note. Mtg = meeting.

4
2
2
0
0

3
3
1
0
0

2
2
2
1
0

% of
all

2
2
2
2
0
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37
30
23
10
0
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In reviewing the scoring of this question, the data show that 47% of the
participants were doubtful or strongly doubtful of the potential for the success of the
project and only 10% felt that the project could be successful. The remaining percentage
either had no opinion or did not answer the question.
The question was then asked, “When you concluded this project, how did you rate
its ’ actual success? ” Table 6 shows that all of the participants rated project success as

either negative or strongly negative.

Table 6
Success, as Perceived at Project Conclusion
U.S. Sessions
Mtg. 1. M tg, 2

Strongly Negative
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Strongly Positive

5
3
0
0
0

4
3
0
0
0

German Sessions
Mtg. 1 Mtg. 2

4
3
0
0
0

4
4
0
0
0

% of
all

57
43
00
00
00

Note. Mtg = Meeting.

Summary of the Discussion Questions
This joint-venture project was the first project of this kind experienced by most of
the engineers (81%) in this study. Even though it was their first project of this kind, only
approximately 10% of them felt that the project would be successful, whereas 90% either
felt it would not succeed or just did not answer the question. At the end of the project,
however, all of them stated that in their opinion, the project had failed, even though the
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car was developed for market. They felt that the vehicle had failed to meet profitability
goals.

Findings to Research Question 1
“What were the cultural markers that were prominent during this joint venture
project, as perceived by the engineers who worked on the project?”
From the recordings of each focus group meeting, Uz and I wanted to capture
each individual comment, first taking care to repeat the participant’s words as stated.
There were a total of 177 cards created. Six were later discarded as not being relevant to
the study (they were suggested remedies or fixes). This left a total of 171 comments that
were used for cultural markers. The cultural markers utilized the research of Gert
Hofstede, Edward Hall, and the team of Fons Trompenaars and Charles HampdenTumer. The headings identified were:
1.

Formality. Those comments related to whether or not the person appeared to

require specific structure and discipline or require the free-flow of non-structured
proceedings. Examples of such comments from the American participants were:
“Germans are always formal.”
“They live by rules and regulations, leaving no room for spontaneous creativity.”
“They didn’t like me talking directly to my counterparts in their organization.
They are a very ‘top-down’ organization.”
“We have what we call ‘an open-door policy’. The Germans seem to have a
‘closed-door’ policy.”
Examples of such comments from the German participants were:
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“We respect the hard work that one goes through to get the title ‘Doctor’. They
deserve to be respected.”
“Our roles and responsibilities were clearly defined. It makes things easier and
actually speeds decisions.”
“The Americans were undisciplined. They did not adhere to schedules. They
didn’t like rules and procedures. We feel procedures avoid confusion.”
2. Risk Response. Those comments related to whether or not the person was
able to take action without requiring extensive detail were placed in this category. Some
examples from the American comments were:
“They want to have all decisions approved before they act.”
“They couldn’t decide anything without checking with the home office.”
“Our partners wanted to talk things to death and get a dozen approvals before
making a decision.”
Some examples from the German comments were:
“They think that they can do anything, as long as no one has told them not to.
They like to take chances where we like to do our research first.”
“We feel that taking undisciplined risk is very dangerous to success.”
“I thought that they were terribly impulsive and liked to take unnecessary risks.”
3. Results Orientation. Those comments which related to being concerned
with the outcome or w ith the process were placed in this category. Examples of American
comments were:
“Whenever an issue came up, the people from Baumgart always wanted to give
you the history of the issue from the beginning of time. We just wanted a decision.”
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Examples of American comments were:
“There are good reasons why we insist that certain specific steps are taken when
developing a new vehicle system. We have learned over the years what works and what
does not.
4.

Social Exchange. Those comments related to whether the person seemed to

be driven by emotional involvement and or by perceived rules were included in this
category. Examples of American comments were:
“I assumed that our German partners were blunt and to the point and not very
polite about it. I figured that they were really stubborn and unmovable.”
“We gave each other confusing messages (verbal and non-verbal).”
“We try to ‘build castles without pouring the foundation’. By that I mean that we
don’t do the fundamentals that are required to support the theory.”
“I guess that we thought the Germans were cold. They wanted to get to the point
without any niceties ahead of time.”
Examples of German comments were:
“They (Americans) didn’t respect us or each other. They wanted agreement
without discussion.”
“We were told to keep the Americans happy, but don’t let that get in the way of
doing your job.”
“Americans like to make jokes, even before we talked about the business we had
to do. I felt like they were not taking me seriously and didn’t think what I wanted to say
was important.”
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“The Americans acted as if they wanted to be friends first. I had difficulty with
that. For us, friendship is earned and has no relevance to the workplace.”
5. Adaptability. Those comments related to whether or not the person seemed
to strive for consensus among parties were included here. Some examples are:
“Germans are unable to adapt to changes quickly. They insist upon perfecting
procedures and are slow to change them.”
“The Americans always wanted agreement without first figuring out how the
agreement must work.”
6. Operating Authority. Those comments related to whether the person
seemed to place a higher value on the job level of the person or the expertise of the
person were placed in this category. Both the German participants and the American
participants made essentially the same comments. For example:
“The Americans wanted us to believe they were right just because they said so.
We have learned that all decisions must be supported by knowledge of the subject.”
“He’s worked his way up through the organization for many years. Someone has
to be ultimately responsible.”
“ He may not be boss, but that’s only because he didn’t chose to be.”
“In this country, we’re really not included either. We get direction that we don’t
understand, because we don’t know where it comes from or why.”
“We (the partners) seem to have conflicting directions from our respective
management. We all thought we were right, yet we seldom agree on the best course of
action.”
“It made me think that they thought that they were going to dictate to us.”
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Highlights of Findings
Research Question 1
O f the eight cultural markers identified, only six cultural markers were evident
during this joint venture project. O f these, the cultural marker of Social Exchange led the
focus group comments, followed closely by the cultural markers of Formality, Risk
Response, and Operating Authority. (There was no evidence found relating to the cultural
markers o f Use o f Time or Individualism.)

Research Question 2
“How did these cultural markers affect the overall success of the project, as
perceived by the engineers who worked on the project?”
Each focus group participant recognized that cultural markers definitely had an
effect on the overall success of the project. Under the cultural marker of Formality, the
engineers from the United States talked about how their company had spent many years
developing employee relations to promote a work atmosphere that each person was
equally valued and made their own contributions to the success of the company. Early in
this German-American joint-venture partnership, The American engineers witnessed
much more structure than they were used to in their dealings with the Germans, which
they perceived as formality and incorrectly interpreted as arrogance. The German
engineers, on the other hand, were focused on exhibiting the utmost importance of this
project and the seriousness of that success. The German engineers made the faulty
assumption that their American counterparts were not treating the project with the same
importance.
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Under the culture marker of Risk Response, the German participants stated that
they had learned over time that it was unwise to use their instincts and emotions for
planing action. They preferred to examine alternatives and base their actions on research
and consultation because they could not afford to squander resources. The Americans
perceived this as causing unnecessary delays and false starts. They also stated that the
risk of delay was worse than the risk of potentially making a mistake.
The cultural marker of Social Exchange generated the most problems for both the
German and American participants. Each group felt that they were communicating well,
yet there were many occasions of false starts, timing and performance targets being
missed, inappropriate responses to directions, and faulty assumptions being made,
resulting in cost over-runs. These problems were not resolved until late into the project.
Issues under the culture of Operating Authority were the most difficult to resolve.
Both the American and the German engineers stated that they were acting within the
specific direction of their respective senior management, who were told to plan and
implement the changing o f Global Motors and Baumgart AG into one global company.
At the working engineer level, each side appeared to have different direction, causing one
side to think that agreements were made while the other side felt that no agreement was
made. That problem still existed at the projects’ conclusion.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
This chapter summarizes the purpose of the study, an overview of the literature,
the methodology of the study and its findings. It also discusses the findings and presents
recommendations as a result of the study

Statement of the Problem
Global Motors North America and Baumgart AG of Germany each produced its
own small car, which appears to be a duplication of efforts. Plans were made to develop
the small car in the United States and sell this vehicle in all markets. Engineers from
Germany came to work with the U.S. engineers on the development of the small car. This
was considered to be an effective way to address the needs of both markets.
Subsequently, the joint team of U.S. and German engineers brought the first vehicle
developed jointly to market. However, it was not as efficient and cost-effective as hoped.
The two main problems encountered were delays in creating vehicle designs (which
caused subsequent delays in testing), and work instructions that were interpreted
incorrectly. Since this was a multi-cultural project, there was a need for the two
companies to understand the dynamics of cultural factors at work during the process.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine perceived cultural markers at work
during the joint-vehicle development project between Global Motors North America and
Baumgart AG by first identifying the markers and then investigating their effects on the
overall success of the joint-venture project.

Overview of the Literature
Literature reviewed for this study covers three major areas: organizational culture
(including organizational culture and global companies), cross-cultural issues, and
cultural markers.
Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Tumer (2001) say that organizational
culture is created through the dispersion of core values and competencies throughout all
levels of the organization. A strong organizational culture increases consistency of
behavior across individuals in an organization. They further add that in every culture in
the world, authority, bureaucracy, validation, and accountability are experienced in
different ways. The problem is that words can take on different meanings as they move
from culture to culture. The managers of global organizations must maintain a delicate
balance between the need for standardization in organizational design and procedures,
and local characteristics of the market, legislation, and the socio-political-cultural system.
Under the umbrella of organizational culture, “subcultures” develop. Subcultures
arise when groups of people have a specific responsibility. Jones (1983) identified
distinct subcultures within an organizational structure:
1.

Production culture arises when the production process is routine and the work

is standardized. The consumer product is easily identified as the output.
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2. Bureaucratic culture arises when the task includes routine elements and the
process by which inputs are converted into outputs becomes obscure. The supporting
paperwork or information is the output.
3. Professional culture sets the norms itself and is process oriented, not product
oriented. The output is not so much the consumer product as it is the process by which
the idea for the consumer product is created.

Cross-Cultural Issues
Cross-cultural issues arise in the business world at the managerial level, simply
because companies with branches in different countries organize their daily business
differently. According to Hofstede (1991) three of the major differences are:
1. Relative hierarchy of departments: The relative power of the various
departments within a corporation is often a function of the country where the facility is
located.
2. Sharing of information: There is little sharing of information within a
hierarchical level across departments (Lewis, 2001).
3. Degree of formality: There is little sharing of information within a
department’s command structure.
Cultural markers can be defined as patterns of beliefs and values that are
attributable to a specific group of people. For example, in German culture, work
relationships are strongly influenced by the medieval guild system wherein the engineer
and the Meister (often an engineer himself) fill hero roles (Hofstede, 1998). In such a
system, the worker is a highly trained individual whose well-developed skill, based on
training in the apprentice system, establishes his/her expertise and hierarchical position in
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the production process. German workers expect, however, the Meister to be the ultimate
expert in resolving problems and to give orders when needed (Hofstede, 1998).
American culture can be described as a pro-active orientation with a certain
informality in superior-subordinate relationships. It rests, moreover, on individualism and
achievement coupled with the belief that anything is possible (Stewart & Bennett, 1991).
The pressure to be a team player is very tangible in U.S. organizations; yet, to be a teamplayer means that whole-hearted commitment to a course of action is expected, not
consensus (Mole, 1992).
The cultural markers discussed in this literature are as follows:
1. Individualism. Hofstede (1980) interprets individualism as whether the
society the good of the few or the good of the many.
2. Formality. Hofstede (1980) found that the greater the power distance in an
organization, the more formal the behavior.
3. Risk Response. Hofstede (1980) defines “uncertainty avoidance” as the
extent to which a society feels threatened by the unknown.
4. Results Orientation. Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) refer to
a dimension which stresses standardization of processes versus results of the process.
5. Use of Time. Hall (1980) defines two basic time systems: Monochronic time
means paying attention to and doing only one thing at a time. Polychronic time means
being involved with many things at once.
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6. Social Exchange: Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) in the value
dimension “universalism versus particularism” say that an individual needs rales from
which to operate. When there is none, they create them from their experience and they
might not be correct.
7. Adaptability: Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer (2001) define culture as
“the way a group of people solve problems and reconcile dilemmas” (p. 43)
8. Operating Authority: Trompenaars and Hampden-T umer (2001) in the
value dimension “Achievement versus Ascription” (which discusses performance
authority vs. position authority) ask if a group values social position or if it values
performance.

Methodology
This study was designed to identify cultural markers at work in a joint-venture
vehicle development team and to evaluate the perceived impact of these cultural markers
on the success of this project. The study group consisted of engineers from Global
Motors o f the United States and engineers from Baumgart AG of Germany. For all the
reasons stated below, focus group research methodology was selected for this study.
1. Focus groups are a research method devoted to data collection.
2. Interaction and group discussion are the source of the data.
3. Focus groups acknowledge the researcher's active role in creating the group.
4. I have had past successes establishing and facilitating focus groups.
5. Focus group interaction provokes new perspectives on issues at hand.
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Procedure
I wanted to give each member of the project team equal opportunity to participate.
For that reason, I made arrangements for focus groups to take place both in Germany and
the United States. To allow for possible conflict in personal schedules, two focus groups
were held in each country. Participants could choose either focus group session. Twentyseven percent of the project team chose to participate.
The ongoing dialogue during each focus group session was recorded for later
transcription, using two tape recorders located in different points in the room to ensure
complete data collection. In order to ensure anonymity, the facilitators served as
transcribers, assigning pseudonyms for each participant. Transcribed comments were
categorized under the cultural marker that the comment seemed to reference.

Findings
A total o f four focus group sessions were scheduled. Thirty engineers from the
U.S. and Germany attended the four sessions. This represented 27% of all the engineers
who worked on the project. A mixture of both U.S. and German engineers participated in
each session.
Sixty-seven percent o f the participants in the U.S. focus group sessions were
engineers from Global Motors, a company based in the United States. Thirty-three
percent of the participants in the U.S. focus group sessions were from Baumgart AG, a
company based in Germany.
Seventy-three percent o f the participants in the focus group sessions held in
Germany were engineers from Baumgart AG, whereas 27% o f the participants in these
sessions were from Global Motors. The Baumgart AG participants outnumbered the
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Global Motors participants by a rate of 2.7 to 1 in the sessions held in Germany. All
sessions, whether in Germany or the United States, consisted of a mixture of both
German and American engineers.
Within Global Motors, 85.7% of their participants were under the age of 41.
Within the Baumgart AG group of participants, 43.75% were under the age of 41. Within
the Global Motors participant group, 14.3% were in the age group 41 to 65. Within the
group of participants from Baumgart AG, 56.25% were in that age group.
Seniority, for the purpose of this study, is defined as the amount of time spent
working for the current employer. Baumgart had no volunteers with less than 11 years of
seniority, whereas 21.4% of the Global Motors volunteers had less than 11 years. The
Baumgart AG participants with more than 25 years’ seniority outnumbered the
participants from Global Motors by a ratio of nearly 2 to 1.
The participants were also asked to indicate their level o f formal education. A
comparison of the two groups shows that 56% of the Baumgart group held graduate or
post-graduate degrees, as compared to 14% of the Global Motors group.
The answer to research question 1, “What were the cultural markers that were
prominent during this joint venture project, as perceived by the engineers who worked on
the project? ” was reached by analyzing the transcribed comments from the focus group
sessions. Social Exchange (Facts vs. Emotion), Formality (Structure vs. Unstructured),
Risk Response (aversion to risk vs. comfort with risk), and Operating Authority (position
vs. expertise) were identified as being dominant cultural markers on this joint venture
project. Their was no comments relating to the cultural markers of Adaptability or of the
cultural marker of Use of Time.
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The answer to research question 2, "How did these cultural markers affect the
overall success o f the project, as perceived by the engineers who worked on the project? ’’
Focus group team members stated that the overali success of the project was definitely
affected by the presence of cultural markers in the following ways:
"Success was impeded early-on. ”
"Faulty assumptions were made. ”
"Timing was missed. ”
"Performance targets were missed. ”
“There were inappropriate responses to directions. ”
"Decisions weren’t made. ”
"There were many false starts. ”
"We assumed we had agreement, when there was no agreement. "
"Teamwork was non-existent at first. ”

Discussion of the Findings
This focus group can be characterized as being relatively young (about 65% were
under the age of 41), having stable careers (about 60% had more than 20 years’ seniority)
and well educated (100% had bachelor’s degrees and 30% held graduate degrees). These
facts indicated that, while I would have liked more volunteers to participate, this was an
excellent representation of the average member of this joint- venture project team.
At the start of the project, 90% of the group felt that there was not a high
probability o f success. At the conclusion of the project, 100% did not feel successful.
Further investigation revealed that this was rooted in how they viewed success. The
project car was, in fact, placed on the market and has had a reasonable number of
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vehicles sold. The problem was that this group viewed success as occurring when target
dates were met for production of the vehicle and target costs of production were not over
run.
The literature talks about eight cultural markers to look for in this type of study. I
found only four had major presence on this first joint-venture project team. They were
Social Exchange (motivated by facts vs. emotion), Formality (Structured vs. Unstructured
tasks), Risk Response (aversion to risk vs. comfort with risk), and Operating Authority
(position authority vs. expertise authority). Two cultural markers that were found to have
minor impact, Results Orientation (whether a person was more concerned with the
results or the process used to obtain the results) and Adaptability (those comments
related to whether or not the person seemed to strive for consensus among parties). The
focus group responses showed no evidence of the cultural markers of Individualism (the
good of the few vs. the good o f the many) or Use o f Time (tasks performed sequentially
vs. tasks performed concurrently).
The cultural marker of Social Exchange permeated both groups. An engineer
called in “false communication.” This meant that each partner group attempted to
verbally communicate and assumed that the other side understood. Because non-verbal
communication skills rest in each person’s frame of experience, the likelihood of true
understanding was severely limited. The failure of each group to understand the other
group’s frame of experience (especially cultural background) resulted in faulty
interpretations on both sides.
The U.S. focus group participants stated that formality in the workplace has been
virtually eliminated in the environment of most U.S. businesses. Conventional thinking in
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U.S. companies is that formality stifles communication, causing potential problems and
workplace innovations not to be brought to light. Also, that U.S. corporations want to
promote (at least superficially) the idea that all workers are equal. They tended to
interpret formality as arrogance. The German participants stated first that formality was
efficient and that it was respectful of superiors and their accomplishments.
The German participants said that decisions must be made with as much
knowledge as possible, in order to minimize risk. One German participant suggested that
because their country was so much smaller than the United States (about the size of
Minnesota and Wisconsin put together) any squandering of resources is felt much more
deeply than in the U.S. He further added that he felt that this kind of thinking permeates
German business and that the U.S. psyche was bom when the U.S. was bom with
unlimited resources.
Operating Authority was a cultural marker that caused much consternation in both
groups. The Americans appeared to believe that they had authority unless their bosses
specifically denied it. Germans wanted their bosses to be ultimately responsible because
“it was their jobs.” These conflicting notions caused delays.
The two cultural markers Results Orientation and Adaptability generated only a
few comments from the focus group. Under Results Orientation, the group members
knew their mission and had consistent goals; the straggle was in agreeing on how to meet
those goals. Under Adaptability, the group indicated a willingness to adapt but straggled
with the method for adopting consensus.
I was not surprised when there were no focus group responses for the cultural
marker of Use o f Time. It is the nature of the manufacturing business world that most
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tasks must be completed concurrently, in order to meet market demands. However, I was
surprised to have no comments classified under the cultural marker of Individualism.
Because of the literature I reviewed for this study, I would have expected Americans to
be characterized as being oriented around the success of the individual and Germans to be
characterized for being oriented around the success of the group.

Conclusions
Social Exchange is much more than just communication. Social Exchange
recognizes that in any inter-personal relationship (work or social) each party responds
from their individual frame of reference. They make decisions and take actions based
upon their past experiences and environments. These experiences and environments
comprise their individual cultural markers. In order for communication to be effective,
each party must understand “where the other person is coming from.” Verbal and non
verbal communication is not enough. We must understand what experience is behind the
verbal and non-verbal communication.
In this study, Social Exchange is, in fact, the force behind the responses for
Formality, Risk Assessment, and Operating Authority. Not understanding where the other
party was “coming from” was the primary cause for comments recorded. Americans, as a
group, appeared to be casual and emotional. Germans appeared to be formal and factoriented. The root problem is the assumptions that are made by individuals from one
culture when they witness the action of another individual from another culture. It has
been my experience that mankind must assign meaning to everything that he witnesses.
When no meaning is apparent, mankind creates one. By lacking intimate knowledge of
other cultures, erroneous assumptions can be and are often made.
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Although the culture of the United States was formed with input from many
nations and has several major regional subcultures, there exists a group of shared core
values that is reinforced and rewarded by a majority of the people of the United States.
Those values are promoted and perpetuated by the corporate cultures of the major
companies and popular media. However, they are seldom made explicit, nor are they
subjected to conscious examination. Therefore, most Americans are unconscious bearers
of our cultural baggage, and we mistakenly assume that Europeans are only a slightly
different culture (Lewis, 2001).
When dealing with Europeans, it is essential for Americans to recognize that
some of these values may not be shared, accepted, or appreciated. In certain cases,
directly opposing values will be encountered. The second mistake that Americans make
(although the European Union may change this in the future) is thinking that such a group
called Europeans “exists.” There are Italians, Dutch, Germans, Greeks, and Portuguese.
There are also Basques, Catalonians, and Serbs. The point is that the ethnic diversity of
Europe requires an understanding of the specific cultures with which one is dealing.
Understanding the concepts behind Social Exchange has broad implications. In
any situation where a group of individuals must work together to accomplish a specific
goal, interpersonal relationships are key to that group’s success. Understanding each
participant’s cultural markers is key to building interpersonal relationships.
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Recommendations

Practice
The outcome of this study suggests that any joint-venture project undertaken in
the future by Global Motors should identify the project team and the specific national,
regional, and organizational cultures of these team members. This should be done at least
3 months prior to the project’s inception.
Expert activity (probably contracted from outside of the company) needs to
design culture-specific total immersion training to fit the makeup of the subject group. It
is imperative that this training should emphasize that each group must first recognize its
own cultural mental-models that drive their behavior.

Further Research
1. Global Motors is a worldwide organization with many additional strategic
partnerships. This study was limited to one specific joint-venture project occurring
between Global Motors U.S.A. and Baumgart AG of Germany. This study should be
replicated with a Global Motors -Asian partnership and with a Global Motors-Latin
American partnership for further research.
2. Further research should be considered to determine causes of non-participation
in this study (such as to understand why no female engineers volunteered for this study).
3. This study should be replicated in any other situation, business or otherwise,
where a group of people was formed to facilitate the successful completion of a common
goal.
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Invitation E-Mail (reworded for anonymity, as required by the company studied)
From : dale phi Hips
To: Members of the Joint Venture Team
Sent: Saturday, October 25, 2002 6:55 PM
Subject: Improving the Joint Venture Process
Global Motors wants to continuously improve their ability to manage as one
company, and this is our first step in doing that. You are invited to participate in a
focus group session to discuss our first j oint-venture proj ect between Global Motors
and Baumgart AG. Many questions come to mind about the lessons that we might
have learned from the program. It was felt that we should start our understanding by
talking the people who worked the "front lines" and try to learn the things that they
learned from their experience. In other words, "How can we do things better the
next time around?" You should also know that, although the things that we say and
do here will remain anonymous, the results of these sessions would also be used for
two activities:
1. To capture "lessons learned" from this project, in an effort to improve
possible future joint venture programs.
2. As the basis for a Doctoral Dissertation, which I hope will improve further
successes as become a global company.
One day of your time will be all that is required. With the help of IJz Wagemann of
Baumgart AG, you may pick one of 4 alternative sessions, based upon your own
scedule requiremnts. The sessions are as follows:
• December 16, 2002, Detroit Michigan. The Auditorium at Global Motors
Engineering 9am-3:00pm
• December 17, 2002, Detroit Michigan. The Auditorium at Global Motors
Engineering 9am-3:00pm
• December 16, 2002, Baumgart AG Headquarters, Baumgart, Germany 9 am3:00pm
• December 17, 2002, Baumgart AG Headquarters, Baumgart, Germany 9am3:00pm
Thank you in advance for helping this project. Please feel free to contact me with
any questions.

Dale Phillips
Systems Engineering
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Transcripts of Focus Group Sessions

Cross-cultural Communications
December 16, 2002

For the purpose o f this transcription and to insure anonymity, all persons speaking are
assigned a pseudonym in the form of a letter and number code:

FI

Facilitator for the focus group session

A1

First speaker from the United States

A2

Second speaker from the United States

A3

Third speaker from the United States

A4

Fourth speaker from the United States

A5

Fifth speaker from the United States

A6

Sixth speaker from the United States

B1

First speaker from Germany

B2

Second speaker from Germany
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Introduction:
My name is Dale Phillips. We are here today for a couple of reasons. You were
invited here because you were recently involved in our first joint-venture project
between Global Motors and Baumgart AG. Global Motors wants to continuously
improve their ability to manage as one company, and this is our first step in doing that.
Many questions come to mind about the lessons that we might have learned
from your program. It was felt that we should start our understanding by talking the
people who worked the “front lines” and try to learn the things that they learned from
their experience. In other words, “How can we do things better the next time around?”
You should also know that, although the things that we say and do here will
remain anonymous, the results of these sessions would also be used as the basis for a
Doctoral Dissertation, which I will be submitting at a later date.
I’d like to begin by telling you a little about myself. I have 37 years at Global
Motors and I’ve had numerous and varied assignments within Product Engineering. I’ve
supervised both union and salaried personnel at various times, mostly in the prototype
shop area and the technical documentation area. I’ve been in the military during the
Vietnam era and I’ve been a night student for many years. I like baseball and trout
fishing and I’ve been married 34 years. Who wants to go next?
A l: F ve been at Global for 16 years. I played football at college and majored in
mechanical engineering. I’ve got 2 children, ages 6 and 8. W e’re into scouting and Tball and we like to tent camp in the summertime. My job on the last program was
suspension engineer.
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A2:1 went to school at GMI and majored in electrical engineering. My
responsibility on this program was in entertainment systems. We created new digital
technology and we were able to make it work for a production assembly operation.
I’ve been married a little over a year. We honeymooned in the Caribbean aboard
a cruise ship.
My wife teaches grade school here locally.
A 3 :1’ve moved around a lot in Global Motors. My first job was on the line in
Janesville. I decided that if I was going to Stay in manufacturing, I wanted to get off the
floor and into an office. Went to school for a manufacturing engineering related degree.
I was in Indiana as a production planner for a couple of years, then I transferred
to Flint Tool & Die. The manufacturing group does a good job of giving us wellrounded experience in all manufacturing areas. I got the chance to come to the home
office and help plan for the set-up of a new flexible manufacturing system for a totally
new vehicle and I jumped at it.
Bl: In Germany, our best chance at an education is to first spend time in our
military. I spent 6 years in the air force and earned enough credit to attend the university
by the time I got out. It is kind of like your “G.I. Bill”.
My wife works in the travel industry. She gets many special deals and we like to
travel a lot. I went to one of your air forces training schools in Texas when I was in the
military.
A4:1 work in steering systems, but my real passion is restoring old cars. For
some reason, the uglier the car the more I like. Fm currently rebuilding a 1956 Pontiac
Star Chief.
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My son is teaching me to golf. He’s all state in high school and plans to study
golf course management in college. His sister is going to be a nurse. My wife and I
recently moved into a new home. We’re laying sod this weekend, if anyone wants to
help!
ALL: (laughter)
A5: No thanks! - That was my first job! - 1 grew up around here when much of
this area was still country. I used to be able to ride my bike for hours and not see more
than 5-10 cars. We could fish, too! They weren’t fit to eat, but we didn’t care.
I never really knew “what I wanted to be when I grew up”. I started to work for
a car company when I was 18 and before I realized it, I was 30 years old and had a
family. After much night school, here I am.
B2:1 always wanted to be an engineer. I like to know how things work and I
like to make them work better.
While I was at the University, I also joined the ski patrol so that I could ski free
and meet girls. Now I have a wife and we have traveled by bicycle through much of our
area in Germany.
We recently bought a very old house that we are repairing.
A6: I’m a brake systems engineer. My work is in physical test at the Proving
Grounds. I actually came from another car company about 3 years ago because I had an
opportunity to grow, professionally. I’m a single man and I love the outdoors. I recently
returned from the Rockies.
F I: Had your group or division discussed Global Motors long-term business
strategy?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
Bl: You have to remember that, when we began this project, the idea that we
were “one company-one world” was not thought of. When it did come, we were told to
’’keep the Americans happy, but don’t let that get in the way of doing your job.
A2: We had a job to do and we wanted to get at it. We just figured that it was
one more “plan of the month”. We thought that if was serious, they’d tell us otherwise, so new idea would come along and we’d change again.
FI: Would you say that you never heard of the long-term strategy?
B2: We heard, but it came much later. Those things are usually not our concern.
Decisions about that are made at a much higher level.
A5: In this country (USA), we’re really not included either. We get direction
that we don’t understand, because we don’t know where it comes from or why.
A4: Being aware of the strategy would remove a good part of the confusion.
A1: There are many things that I could help with
A2: I’d like the challenge of helping plan.
F I: How much did you really need to know about long-term strategy to do
your job?
A6: In terms of just ‘doing our job’, we probably didn’t need to know much
about the strategy. The thing is, they keep talking that we’re a team, but not being
included in planning and strategy tends to make you feel ‘out of the loop’ and that
you’re not as highly valued as the next guy.
B2: When I am respected, I’ll know it. I’ll be invited to those meetings.
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A4: See, none of that’s important to me. Where I get upset is that we keep ‘re
inventing the wheel’. That is, a lot of us have knowledge from experience, but they
don’t take advantage o f it and they keep repeating the same problems.
FI: How much knowledge of the long-term strategy was important to you?
A3: We all just want to feel part of the team. We could have made quicker,
better decisions if we knew the strategy
F I : Did you agree with the strategy? Why or why not?
A l: I understood why the strategy of becoming a global corporation was
important. Basically, the expense of developing, certifying and manufacturing a car
could be spread across more units. The problem is that, over the years, we have
embraced countless different management and financial theories and - you know what?
- They’re all good! The problem is that we are very poor implementers! We tend to try
to build castles in the sand, without pouring footings to support them. We always do the
easy part of the theory and avoid doing the hard part. We don’t do the fundamentals
required to support the theory.
A 5 :1 always called it the ‘foam on the beer’. We want this nice glass of beer,
but all we do is “sip the foam.”
F I: Did it affect your over-ail job performance?
All: (Consensus) We were slower than we should have been.
F I : Did your management offer sufficient explanation of the short-term
business plan?
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B l: We knew that we were going to build several different cars from the same
basic chassis. We were afraid that we would have to make engineering compromises
that would make our car weaker in our market.
A3: To us, it meant small cars for the U.S. big car market. We were afraid that
they wouldn’t sell.
A4: Off the record, we thought that if we had to be a global company, we should
have Europe do the small cars and U.S. do the big cars. That way, we would have fewer
compromises.
F I : Did your management explain how the short-term business plan
supported the long-term strategy?
All (Consensus): No they did not explain how. Only that it would.
F I: How might this knowledge help or hinder your ability to do your job?
B2: Unnecessary. That is other’s concerns.
A6:1 was more concerned with the product, not with the strategy or plan.
A2:1 think most of us are resigned that we don’t impact plans or strategies.
F I : Did you agree with the business plan? Why or why not?
A 5 :1 think that the over-all idea is good. I don’t think we understand'well
enough what the customer wants in all the various cultures and I don’t think we
implement well at all.
A l: Agreed.
F I: Did the level of business plan understanding affect your job
performance?
All: (consensus) Again, we were probably slower than we could have been.
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FI: Had you worked on other joint vehicle development programs? Let’s
talk about the successes or setbacks th at you experienced in other joint vehicle
development programs.
B2: We (the partners) didn’t seem to be playing by the same rules. We needed to
protect our interests, so that the other side did not cause us problems down the line.
A6: In my case, we wanted a specific process used in setting of dies, for
improved quality. Since our partners had part responsibility, they insisted on using their
old process (so they didn’t have to invest money). Our part quality fell by 15%. Our
warranty cost went up.
A3: Our partners on our project were very stubborn. They didn’t understand that
safety requirements o f our government were much stricter in that area.
FI: Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with your experience in other joint
vehicle development programs?
Bl: I was very glad when it was over.
(Group consensus)
F I: W hat things contributed to your satisfaction and dissatisfaction?
A2: Our partners wanted to talk things to death and get a dozen approvals before
making a decision.
Bl: The other group wanted to leap to a decision without doing their
‘homework’. Like their ‘cowboys’, they wanted to shoot first and ask questions later.
FI: At he conclusion of these prior joint-venture projects, did your team
review its performance for lessons learned?
A5: Heck no! - We just wanted to put the project behind us.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126
B2: We just decided it was the other side’s fault and went to the next program
(laughter).
FI: Were you optimistic or less than optimistic about this joint-venture
project before you started?
A4:1 think that’s pretty obvious! None of us had anything good to say about our
other experiences. (General agreement).
FI: What are some of the pre-conceived ideas you held as you started this
project?
A 3 :1 assumed that our German partners were blunt and to the point and not very
polite about it. I figured that they were really stubborn and unmovable, even with
reasoned argument.
Bl: Americans are not respectful of their superiors. They think that they can do
anything, along as no one has told them not to. They like to take chances where we like
to do our research first.
B2: They’re cowboys!
Al: They think titles are important. For us, people are people and titles are not
that important.
FI: Did any of your pre-conceived ideas change as you concluded this
project?
A6:1 don’t think out pre-conceived ideas changed much. What did happen is
that we started understanding each other’s cultures and behaviors better as time went
by.
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FI: How did you rate the success of this joint-venture vehicle development
program at its’ conclusion?
B2: Better than I first expected, but we wasted a lot of time defending our
positions. The program missed a lot of its timing and financial goals, but if the same
people were assigned another project, we would do a lot better.
FI: Why do you think that?
A5: We saw behavior in each other and made assumptions about that behavior
based on the worlds that we understood. It led to a lot of faulty assumptions and many
responses that were not appropriate, had we better understood each other. We really all
wanted to do the right thing.
FI: Were some aspects of this joint-venture project more successful than
other aspects?
A l: What really surprised me was that many of us became close, personal
friends as an unexpected outcome. Several of us actually have visited and vacationed
with each other since then.
FI: W hat lessons did you learn from this joint-venture project?
A5: People are people. It would have helped us to have training in each other’s
culture, separate of any team project and well before any team project. We all saw each
other’s way of operating and made wrong assumptions. This greatly impeded success
early in the project.
Bl: It took us many weeks to see our communication problem.
FI: Describe the level of teamwork over the life of this project.
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A2:1 think we’ve all said that teamwork had greatly improved by the end of the
project.
B2: If we only could have had that teamwork in the beginning. We had much to
learn about each other.
B l : I remember one of the Americans coming to Germany to correct our
findings. He was embarrassed when he was the one who was corrected.
FI: What cultural markers did the team exhibit during this joint-venture
project?
B l: I had the biggest problem understanding that the Americans like to make
jokes, even before we talked about the business we had to do. I felt like they were not
taking me seriously and didn’t think what I wanted to say was important.
A 3 :1 guess that we thought the Germans were cold. They wanted to get to the
point without any niceties ahead of time. It made me think that they thought that they
were going to dictate to us.
A l: I didn’t like when they introduced or referred to themselves by titles like
‘Doctor’. It was like they wanted to intimidate or though they were ‘better’.
B2: You don’t understand. We respect the hard work that one goes through to
get the title ‘doctor’. They deserve to be respected.
Bl: It drove me crazy when they were never on time to meetings.
A5: Whenever an issue came up, the people from Baumgart always wanted to
give you the history of the issue from the beginning of time. We just want a decision.
A4: They couldn’t decide anything without checking with the home office.
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FI: Do you think that any of these cultural markers affected the success of
this project? If yes, how?
B l: We had many problems at first. We did not understand each other or why
we each thought the way we did.
A l: I agree. This caused us to have many ‘false starts’. We would think we had
agreement only to find out later that we did not.
A4: We were mighty slow ‘getting away from the starting line’.
FI: What things were pleasant surprises about this project?
A5: We liked each other by the time we were done!
ALL: (Laughter and general agreement)
F I: In hindsight, what things could have been better managed? How?
A l : We did a lot of preliminary ‘team building’ exercises. These get-togethers
were focus on the ideas of group dynamics. They were typical of many things we had
done is past projects and we didn’t understand, at first, why they were less than
successful. We attributed it to language barriers.
What we realized later was that we were victims of ‘cultural barriers’. We didn’t
understand how different cultures see things differently.
A6:1 think that future groups who work on joint global projects need training to
understand each other, before they gain teamwork training.
FI: Would you like to participate in a similar joint- venture project in the
future? Why or why not?
B l : Absolutely! I think future projects would be a chance to improve.
A5:1 think the business will demand it.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

All: (Many words of agreement).
Closing:
I want to thank all of you for your participation. Please be assured that your
thoughts are of great value for future planning. We will be holding a second session
tomorrow, covering the same questions with another group of volunteers.
At the same times, 2 similar sessions are being held in Germany with a different
facilitator. The results of those meetings will be combined with the meetings held here
and a consolidated report will be made.
The good news, for those interested, is that we will be holding a joint
teleconference where that report will be presented to all off the volunteer participants
from Germany and here. You will be invited to express your opinions about this
consolidated report before it goes to management. Your final opinions will be included
in the final report.
Thanks so much for your time!
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Introduction:
My name is Dale Phillips. We are here today for a couple of reasons. You were
invited here because you were recently involved in our first joint-venture project
between Global Motors and Baumgart AG. Global Motors wants to continuously
improve their ability to manage as one company, and this is our first step in doing that.
Many questions come to mind about the lessons that we might have learned
from your program. It was felt that we should start our understanding by talking the
people who worked the “front lines” and try to leam the things that they learned from
their experience. In other words, “How can we do things better the next time around?”
You should also know that, although the things that we say and do here will
remain anonymous, the results of these sessions would also be used as the basis for a
Doctoral Dissertation, which I will be submitting at a later date.
I’d like to begin by telling you a little about myself. I have 37 years at Global
Motors and I’ve had numerous and varied assignments within Product Engineering. I’ve
supervised both union and salaried personnel at various times, mostly in the prototype
shop area and the technical documentation area. I’ve been in the military during the
Vietnam era and I’ve been a night student for many years. I like baseball and trout
fishing and I’ve been married 34 years. Who wants to go next?
A l: I’ve been at Global for 8 years. I played football at college and majored in
electrical engineering. I’ve got 1 child, a boy, age 8. We like biking and we like to tent
camp in the summertime. He starts little league soon.
My job on the last program was electronic steering systems.
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A2:1 went to school at U of M and majored in thermal dynamics. My
responsibility on this program was in HVAC (Heat and Air Conditioning) systems. We
created new technology and we were able to make it work for a production assembly
operation.
I’ve been married a little over 3 years. My wife is in her last year of residency at
Providence Hospital.
A 3 :1 hired into Global Motors right out of high school. I went to the Vietnam
War, followed by many years of night school for Mechanical Engineering. I did much
of my early work in fuel emissions and now Fm a fuel systems engineer.
B l: I have worked on establishing the new Manufacturing plant for sheet metal
parts. I have a teen age boy who wants my help rebuilding one of your 1967 Mustangs.
I probably should not say that too loud.
A4:1 work in electrical convenience systems, but I really enjoy playing in a
rock-and-roll ‘oldies’ band. We’re playing tonight in Utica. You’re all invited!
ALL: (Laughter)
B 2 :1 always wanted to work on locomotives, running the engine car from town
to town. I think I always wanted the engineer’s cap.
Now I am responsible for chassis system integration. I guess I have a different
kind of cap.
B 3 : 1 used to work for Volkswagen. This company offered better opportunities.
My new work is in suspension systems.
My wife and I were students together. She, tool is an automotive engineer and
she still works at Volkswagen.
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FI: Let’s get started. Had your group or division discussed Global Motors
long-term business strategy?
B l: We always were glad to have Global Motors on the other side of the ocean.
They were not likely to tell us what to do. We liked to run our own business. We would
have no reason to care about Global Motors strategy.
A2: We heard many theories over the years. If it was even discussed, I’m sure
we forgot about it.
B3:1 don’t remember hearing about a ‘Global Motors’ strategy
A 3 :1 might have heard in passing, but nothing specific.
B2: We heard, but decisions about that kind of thing are made at a much higher
level came much later. Those things are usually not our concern.
A4: Being aware of the strategy would remove a good part of the confusion. In
this country (USA), we’re really not included either. We get direction that we don’t
understand, because we don’t know where it comes from or why. I could help with
many things.
F I: How much did you really need to know about long-term strategy to do
your job?
A2: We didn’t ‘need to know’ much about the strategy. We’re supposed to be a
team. It’s just that not being included is kind of an insult.
B2:1 do not see it that way. When a time comes where I am included, I’ll feel
like I am successful.
A4:1 think they could make better strategy, if they knew what we knew. I hate
to see the same problems occur time after time.
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F I: How much knowledge of the long-term strategy was important to you?
A3: I’ll ‘fall on my sword’ for the good of the company. It would help if I knew
where the sword was.
F I: Did you agree with the strategy? Why or why not?
A l: We have always had good intentions. We have never been able to
internalize the theories. When we do succeed in that, the plans get changed.
We have never been able to put these good ideas to work. We don’t know how
to implement. We take the easy way out by doing the things that are easy. The things
that are difficult, we pass them off by saying ‘it takes too much time’ or it’s ‘not value
added’. Really, these are required foundation steps that are either too boring or too
difficult. The failure to do these things makes us fail at implementing.
All strategies are good. We just cause them to fail.
F I: Did it affect your over-all job performance?
All: (Consensus) In the beginning, we moved much too slowly.
F I: Did your management offer sufficient explanation of the short-term
business plan?
B l: Yes, we knew that the plan was to build several different cars from the same
basic chassis. We were afraid that we would have to make engineering compromises
that would make our car weaker in our market.
A3: To us, it meant small cars for the U.S. big car market. We were afraid that
they wouldn’t sell.
A4: We thought a better plan would be to have Europe do the small cars and
U.S. do the big cars. That way, we would have fewer compromises.
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F I: Did your management explain how the short-term business plan
supported the long-term strategy?
All (Consensus): They didn’t say how. They trusted that it would.
FI: How might this knowledge help or hinder your ability to do your job?
A4:1 don’t think that knowledge of the plan, per se, impacted my ability to do
the job. It just would have been nice to know.
ALL: (agreement)
FI: Did you agree with the business plan? Why or why not?
A2: The business plan was sound, as far as it went. Our marketing people tended
to treat people of other worlds the same as they would the U.S. I think that was a
mistake. We need to do a better job of fitting our product to its potential marketplace.
ALL: (agreement)
FI: Did the level of business plan understanding affect your job
performance?
All: (consensus) We might have been a little quicker if we had a better
understanding o f the plan.
FI: Had you worked on other joint vehicle development programs? Let’s
talk about the successes or setbacks that you experienced in other joint vehicle
development programs.
B2: We (the partners) seem to have conflicting directions from our respective
management. We all thought we were right, yet we seldom agree on the best course of
action.
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A 3 :1 was very much struck by how we all wanted the best for our project, but
we couldn’t agree on what the best was.
A2: Our partners on our project were very stubborn.
B l : Our partners were very stubborn!
ALL: (laughter)
FI: Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with your experience in other joint
vehicle development programs?
B l: I was very glad when it was over.
ALL: (Group consensus)
FI: What things contributed to your satisfaction and dissatisfaction?
A2: Germans are always formal. I find that unnerving. They seem very distant
and its weeks before you see one of them smile. They live by rules and regulations,
leaving no room for spontaneous creativity.
B l: The Americans always want agreement without first figuring out how the
agreement must work.
FI: At he conclusion of these prior joint-venture projects, did your team
review its performance for lessons learned?
A4: We always claim to learn, but we make the same mistakes over and over.
B2: We planned ahead of time for all contingencies. We did not need a followup meeting.
F I: What are some of the pre-conceived ideas you held as you started this
project?
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A3: Germans are unable to adapt to changes quickly. They insist upon
perfecting procedures and are slow to change them. They are far from diplomatic.
B1: The dollar takes precedence over everything in the U.S. business world.
They have very little understanding of national honor or protocol.
B2: They are very impatient!
A1: They take themselves far too seriously.
FI: Did any of your pre-conceived ideas change as you concluded this
project?
A6: The pre-conceived ideas were essentially true. What did happen is that we
started understanding each other’s cultures and appreciating our differences.
FI: How did you rate the success of this joint-venture vehicle development
program at its5 conclusion?
B2: Good, but we wasted a lot of time. The program missed a lot of its timing
and financial goals, but if the same people were assigned another project, we would
perform a much better.
FI: Why do you think that?
A1: We better understand each other and the things that drive our respective
behaviors.
FI: Were some aspects of this joint-venture project more successful than
other aspects?
A1: We became friends
FI: What lessons did you learn from this joint-venture project?
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A5: People are people. It would have helped us to have training in each other’s
culture, separate of any team project and well before any team project. We all saw each
other’s way of operating and made wrong assumptions. This greatly impeded success
early in the project.
Bl: You are going to find that some of us have had discussions with your
volunteers from yesterday, so our answers will be close in some questions. We agree
with your group from yesterday who said that we need a better understanding of each
other’s cultural framework.
FI: What cultural markers did the team exhibit during this joint-venture
project?
Bl: The Americans acted as if they wanted to be friends first. I had difficulty
with that. For us, friendship is earned and has no relevance to the workplace.
A3: Germans disagree with people openly and have no tack or diplomacy. They
are so very formal; they survive on protocol.
A1: They didn’t like me talking directly to my counterparts in their organization.
They area very ‘top-down’ organization.
A3: We have what we call ‘an open-door policy’. The Germans seem to have a
‘close-door’ policy.
Bl: We feel that taking undisciplined risk is very dangerous to success.
A2: Germans want to give you the history of the issue from the beginning of
time. We just want a decision.
A4: They couldn’t decide anything without checking with the home office.
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F I: Do you think that any of these cultural markers affected the success of
this project? If yes, how?
B l: This is another subject where we talked with some of the volunteers from
yesterday and we would answer the same way. We did have many problems at first. We
did not understand each other or why we each thought the way we did.
A1: Same here. Like the first group said, we did have many ‘false starts’. We
would think we had agreement only to find out later that we did not.
F I: What things were pleasant surprises about this project?
A2: We were friends by the time we were done!
ALL: (Laughter and general agreement)
F I : In hindsight, what things could have been better managed? How?
A l: I came to believe that we needed to understand each other’s culture, in order
to understand each other’s behavior. We were essentially the same social, educational,
and professional status and background, yet we looked at our tasks differently.
All: (agreement)
Closing:
I want to thank all of you for your participation. Please be assured that your
thoughts are of great value for future planning. We will be holding a second session
tomorrow, covering the same questions with another group of volunteers.
At the same times, 2 similar sessions are being held in Germany with a different
facilitator. The results of those meetings will be combined with the meetings held here
and a consolidated report will be made.
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The good news, for those interested, is that we will be holding a joint
teleconference where that report will be presented to all off the volunteer participants
from Germany and here. You will be invited to express your opinions about this
consolidated report before it goes to management. Your final opinions will be included
in the final report.
Thanks so much for your time!

Transcript of Session 3 Focus Group
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December 16, 2002
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Introduction:
My name is Uz Wagemann. We are here today for 2 reasons. You were invited
here because you were recently involved in our first joint-venture project between
Global Motors and Baumgart AG. Global Motors wants our help to continuously
improve their ability to manage as one company, and this is our first step in doing that.
Many questions come to mind about the lessons that we might have learned
from your program. It was felt that we should start our understanding by talking the
people who worked the “front lines” and try to learn the things that they learned from
their experience. In other words, “How can we do things better the next time around?”
You should also know that, although the things that we say and do here will
remain anonymous, the results of these sessions would also be used as the basis for a
Doctoral Dissertation, which my U.S. counterpart will be submitting at a later date.
I’d like to begin by telling you a little about myself. I have 25 years at Baumgart
AG and I’ve had many assignments, most in the area of performance requirements. I’ve
been in the military, which assisted me in paying for my education. I spent some time in
the U.S., attending NATO defense training while I was in our Air Force. Who would
like to go next?
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B l: I work in Manufacturing planning. We are currently standardizing a plan for
flexible manufacturing in all of our plants. I have been working at Baumgart AG for 6
years.
B 2 :1 work in developing the new motors for our cars. We want to use them in
the joint venture vehicles for sale in Europe and Asia. We are also working with
Shanghai to develop an engine plant there.
A l: I got a chance to come to Germany to work on fuel system emissions and I
jumped at it! It’s been a terrific opportunity to leam!
B3: My work is on ergonomic factors. The better way to explain is that I work
on driver and passenger comfort and ease of use.
My favorite pastime is skiing on holiday.
B4:1 work in marketing planning. We determine what information the customer
requires for decisions to purchase. We then try to appeal to the other things that are
important.
A2: My 12 year-old has developed a passion for soccer. I am learning the game.
As far as work, I am developing the next new high-efficiency transmission. We
want to leam the latest technology. This is to evaluate for use in future vehicles.
B5:1 am trying to live a complete life. Outside of work, I have purchased a 300year-old house that is requiring much o f my time. Our government will provide
financial assistance, if you wish to restore old buildings to their original outside
appearance.
I was educated as an engineer, but I work on future planning.
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B3: My wife and 1 both graduated from the University together about 6 years
ago. She wanted to study physics and I engineering. I work on steering systems.
F I : Let us proceed. H ad your group or division discussed Global Motors
long-term business strategy?
Bl: I have no contact with ‘Global Motors”. I work on autos. I prefer it that
way.
B5: Of course I knew we were all part of Global Motors. I knew that we were
trying to find ways to better work together, but that was not my work. The planners
handle that.
Al: We were given a pep talk before we came over about how we were to be the
first group to work under the global concept. I’m still not sure exactly what that means.
A2:1 think we know what that means as an idea. I think we wanted specific
direction and somehow the bosses back home expected us to figure out that direction on
our own.
B3: We were told to try to keep the Americans happy, but not to let that interfere
with getting work done.
FI: Would you say th at you never heard of the long-term strategy?
B2: It became an issue later, when we were obviously not in harmony.
Al: The presentations we attended all said that we should ‘work together to
achieve world wide success’. It was more ‘rah-rah’ than substance. It didn’t help us
with any tools to do the job.
FI: How much did you really need to know about long-term strategy to do
your job?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145
B4:1 had access to all the technical information that I needed. As long as my
supervisor provided direction, I did not need to know long-term strategy to do my job.
B2: That is for people who are concerned with planning. I had no need for that.
A2: Wouldn’t you (B2) like to know where this project was going and how good
we were doing? I like to feel ‘part of the team.’
B2:1 have confidence in my superiors.
F I : Did you agree with the strategy? Why or why not?
B l: It does not matter if I agree.
B4: But how is your (Bl) enthusiasm? It is easier to work hard if you believe
that you are doing the right thing.
A2:1 think we’d all agree with that.
ALL: (consensus)
FI: Did your management offer sufficient explanation of the short-term
business plan?
Bl: We knew that we were going to build several different cars from the same
basic chassis. We knew we had to be closely coordinated with the U.S. We were
concerned, because any time that we worked with other countries, it was very difficult.
FI: Why was it difficult?
B3: We did not understand each other. Not just language. We thought
differently. We seemed to have different direction.
A2: We heard our Chairman say that we must have common processes and
systems. In Germany, it was like they never heard that message.
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B4: We heard it. The Americans wanted common processes and systems - but
only if we used their processes and systems. There is reasons we do what we do and
they should take those into consideration.
A l: I think both groups were guilty of that.
FI: Did you agree with the business plan? Why or why not?
B5: The over-all idea is good. We don’t have enough follow-up or attention to
detail.
A l: Agreed.
FI: Did the level of business plan understanding affect your job
performance?
B2: We were hesitant to make quick decisions.
FI: Had you worked on other joint vehicle development programs? Let’s
talk about the successes or setbacks that you experienced in other joint vehicle
development programs.
B4: We need to better understand our partners before we try to understand their
market. We always have a communication problem that slows us down or actually
causes mistakes to be made.
A l: I think we Americans can be a little arrogant at times, just like we accuse
our partners. We tend to think we’re the best and leave no room for alternatives.
B5: A little arrogant?
All: (laughter)
FI: W ere you satisfied or dissatisfied with your experience in other joint
vehicle development programs?
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B3: There is no doubt that we should have been better.
F I: Better how?
B2: We gave each other confusing messages (verbal and non-verbal). We should
do better work at understanding each other.
FI: At he conclusion of these prior joint-venture projects, did your team
review its performance for lessons learned?
B3: We all knew our performance and we needed to go onto our next projects.
FI: What are some of the pre-conceived ideas you held as you started this
project?
B l: Americans took their country by force from the natives. They are used to
being the most powerful and want you to know it.
B5: After World War II, we had to work closely together for the benefit of
everyone. For our survival, we depended on one another. I think the Americans were
raised on the idea of self-sufficiency. They like to think they don’t need anyone. It’s
like in the old American Frontier Days. They take their parcel of land, work on it, and
defend it.
B2: They’re cowboys!
A l: They think the boss is always right. We are more apt to challenge when we
don’t agree.
FI: Did any of your pre-conceived ideas change as you concluded this
project?
Bl: Not very much! - But we started to better understand each other and to
accept our different perspectives.
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F I: How did you rate the success of this joint-venture vehicle development
program at its’ conclusion?
A2: If I were grading, I would give us a B- or a C+. Things that should have
been simple for us were much more difficult than they should have been.
All: (Agreement)
FI: Why do you think that?
A l: We made bad assumptions about each other’s behavior.
B3:1 thought that the Americans were more concerned about their own glory,
rather than the success of the team.
FI: Were some aspects of this joint-venture project more successful than
other aspects?
B5: Outside of work, we became close friends. I did not expect that.
FI: What lessons did you learn from this joint-venture project?
A l: I think the front-line workers could have done a better job of making jointventure work, if management would have provided better, clearer leadership.
B l: We did manage to create better documentation processes for groups that
face similar projects in the future.
FI: Describe the level of teamwork over the life of this project.
B4: All teams do better as time goes by. I wish that we were better at the start.
FI: What cultural markers did the team exhibit during this joint-venture
project?
B l: The Americans wanted us to believe they were right just because they said
so. We have learned that all decisions must be supported by knowledge of the subject.
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B2: They didn’t respect us or each other. They wanted agreement without
discussion.
A2:1 made the mistake of not addressing one person as ‘Herr Doctor’. I didn’t
realize that titles were important.
A l : It drove me nuts that no one in our meetings was empowered to make a
decision.
B4: Our roles and responsibilities are clearly defined. It makes things easier and
actually speeds decisions.
A2: When I deal with other departments, I am not allowed to deal directly with
the worker. I have to go to the boss.
F I: Do you think that any of these cultural markers affected the success of
this project? If yes, how?
B l: At first, yes. It took us awhile before we understood.
A2: Us, also.
FI: What things were pleasant surprises about this project?
B4:1 think we learned to respect each other a little better.
All: (Agreement)
FI: In hindsight, w hat things could have been better managed? How?
B3: Not enough value is placed upon internal team communication. It’s hard to
be a team when we don’t understand each other.
A2: Management needs to understand that it’s more than simply teamwork.
Teamwork implies that we are a team to begin with. By that I mean that we are all
starting from the same page.
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Even though Americans are actually a mixture of all races, creeds and cultures,
we start from a common American culture. We make a lot of assumptions about other
cultures without knowing the facts.
FI: Would you like to participate in a similar joint- venture project in the
future? Why or why not?
Bl: I don’t think we have a choice. The world is becoming a global economy
and we have to understand globally.
All: (Many words of agreement).
Closing:
I want to thank all of you for your participation. Please be assured that your
thoughts are of great value for future planning. We will be holding a second session
tomorrow, covering the same questions with another group of volunteers.
At the same times, 2 similar sessions are being held in Germany with a different
facilitator. The results of those meetings will be combined with the meetings held here
and a consolidated report will be made.
The good news, for those interested, is that we will be holding a joint
teleconference where that report will be presented to all off the volunteer participants
from Germany and here. You will be invited to express your opinions about this
consolidated report before it goes to management. Your final opinions will be included
in the final report.
Thanks so much for your time!
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Introduction:
My name is Uz Wagemann. We are here today for 2 reasons. You were invited
here because you were recently involved in our first joint-venture project between
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Global Motors and Baumgart AG. Global Motors wants our help to continuously
improve their ability to manage as one company, and this is our first step in doing that.
Many questions come to mind about the lessons that we might have learned
from your program. It was felt that we should start our understanding by talking the
people who worked the “front lines” and try to leam the things that they learned from
their experience. In other words, “How can we do things better the next time around?”
You should also know that, although the things that we say and do here will
remain anonymous, the results of these sessions would also be used as the basis for a
Doctoral Dissertation, which my U.S. counterpart will be submitting at a later date.
I’d like to begin by telling you a little about myself. I have 25 years at Baumgart AG
and I’ve had many assignments, most in the area of performance requirements. I’ve
been in the military, which assisted me in paying for my education. I spent some time in
the U.S., attending NATO defense training while I was in our Air Force. Who would
like to go next?
A l: I got a chance to come here as a Vehicle Architecture Manager. I thought it
was a great opportunity. I was able to bring my family (I’ve got 2 kids under 12). The
experience for all of us was priceless.
A2:1 was eager to come, also. My wife and I have been able to do weekend
getaways to several European locations.
I had worked in transmissions most of my career and I wanted to work with
German Engineering precision to leam how they did it.
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Bl: I have been recently reassigned from America. We wanted to work together
on new fuel system technology. I, too was excited for an overseas assignment, but I am
glad to be home after 3 years.
B2: Perhaps I’ll get an overseas assignment one day. My work here has been in
chassis electrical systems.
My holidays are skiing. I volunteer for ski patrol and I get to ski at no cost. It is
also good for meeting girls.
ALL: (Laughter)

B 3 :1 take only warm holidays. My wife and I have just returned from Cuba. We
stayed at a private residence with a Cuban family. We spoke no Spanish and they spoke
no German. We were able to converse a little in English.
I work on customer comfort items-the little things that customers like.
B4: Riding and handling is my specialty. There are major differences in
customer wants between the U.S. and Germany. Germans want to feel very stable and
Americans want to feel quick response. The 2 requests are conflicting. You can’t have
both.
B5: My job is to capture engineering specifications, that is, the information that
describes automotive parts and tells in which order they are used.
B6:1 work in manufacturing engineering. We are responsible for building and
running the vehicle assembly plants.
FI: Well, let’s get started. Had your group or division discussed Global
Motors long-term business strategy?
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B l: We had an informational meeting way back-1 don’t remember exactly
when. We have a lot of information meetings. If I’m not working In that area, I don’t
pay heed. I’m working on more immediate problems.
A2: When ever management talks theory, it tends to change many times before
the results are apparent. Then we have new management and they bring in their own
theory.
F I : How much did you really need to know about long-term strategy to do
your job?
B6: Nice to know, but not relevant to getting the job done.
B2: We don’t concern ourselves with long-term strategy. We never see the
direct results.
B4: I’m too busy. Let those who have that job do that job.
FI: How much knowledge of the long-term strategy was important to you?
B3:

It would help us be surer of our actions.

F I : Did you agree with the strategy? Why or why not?
A l:

The strategy is right but I think we have much to leam. We need to be

world knowledgeable and we need to work together for the common good.
FI: Did it affect your over-all job performance?
A2: Things took me much longer to accomplish.
ALL: (Agreement)
F I: Did your management offer sufficient explanation of the short-term
business plan?
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Bl: Yes, but they didn’t offer suggestions on how to make it happen and it
wasn’t clear if we were suppose to do things on our own.
A2: They probably did, but I probably figured it was so much rhetoric. It usually
was, because they change their minds so often.
B6: You have to realize that those decisions are not in our arena, so we pay very
little mind.
FI: How might this knowledge help or hinder your ability to do your job?
B5: As long as my manager provides direction, and he knows the business plan,
I have no need.
A l: Not knowing makes you feel not included. Being not included makes you
feel not worthy. Feeling not worthy makes you not enthusiastic.
A2: We’d like to feel a part of the team.
F I: Did you agree with the business plan? Why or why not?
B2:1 think the plan is good. I think we must support it.
Bl: It is not up to me to agree. My duty is to make it work

FI: Had you worked on other joint vehicle development programs? Let’s
talk about the successes or setbacks that you experienced in other joint vehicle
development programs.
B2: In other countries, cost of labor is much less expensive. Therefore, those
countries with very cheap labor tend to design their factory jobs to be labor intensive.
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In America and Germany, labor is expensive, so we design a lot of automation.
We tend to think our designs are efficient for other countries. It is often not true. It took
us much too long to understand that.
A l: In our partnership with Sweden, we had to develop a more equitable system
of financing. The sales volume on their product did not justify the expense of the
improvements we required. We had to base expense on sales volume.
A2: We are heavily invested in Italy. We should have better understood their
market.
FI: W ere you satisfied or dissatisfied with your experience in other joint
vehicle development programs?
Bl: It was very hard
ALL: (agreement)
FI: What things contributed to your satisfaction and dissatisfaction?
A2: We had trouble understanding each other. Not the language, but the way we
looked at things.
Bl: We had trouble communicating our legal and performance requirements.
B5: Just when we thought we had agreement, something would change.
FI: At the conclusion of these prior joint-venture projects, did your team
review its performance for lessons learned?
B5: Over a beer, later, outside o f work.
A2: Mostly, we just complained and took no definitive action.
FI: Were you optimistic or less than optimistic about this joint-venture
project before you started?
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A4:1 think that’s pretty obvious! None of us had anything good to say about our
other experiences.
All:(General agreement).
F I : What are some of the pre-conceived ideas you held as you started this
project?
B3:1 thought that Americans were pretending to be friendly. I reserve friendship
until it is earned.

Bl: I thought that they were terribly impulsive and liked to take unnecessary
risks.
B2: The Americans were undisciplined. They did not adhere to schedules. They
didn’t like rules and procedures. We feel procedures avoid confusion.
A l: The Germans won’t trust their own knowledge. They want to have all
decisions approved before they act.
A2: They’re far too serious all of the time.
B5: They are informal and it lessens the value of the interaction. They don’t take
you seriously.
F I : Did any of your pre-conceived ideas change as you concluded this
project?
A2:1 won’t say that they changed. I will say that, as time went by, I better
understood.
Bl: Americans have great courage to act on their own. Sometimes I would like a
little of that.
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FI: How did you rate the success of this joint-venture vehicle development
program at its’ conclusion?
B2:1 think we did fairly good, based upon where we started.
B5: We learned from each other and I think we would be better, if we worked
together on another project.
FI: Why do you think that?
A l: We would be pass the ‘honeymoon’ stage
B3: We better understand one another.
FI: Were some aspects of this joint-venture project more successful than
other aspects?
Bl: I would say that it was even.
A2:1 think mutual understanding improved.
FI: What lessons did you learn from this joint-venture project?
A2:1 think anytime 2 cultures are put together to perform a task, you must make
sure that they understand and appreciate each other. I think that very specific training
must take place that doesn’t try to justify behavior, but only helps the people to
understand the roots of behavior.
A2: By doing that, cultural tolerance and understanding are formed.
All: (Agreement)
FI: Describe the level of teamwork over the life of this project.
B4: Teamwork always improves over time or the team dissolves.
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Closing:
I want to thank all of you for your participation. Please be assured that your
thoughts are of great value for future planning. We will be holding a second session
tomorrow, covering the same questions with another group of volunteers.
At the same times, 2 similar sessions are being held in Germany with a different
facilitator. The results of those meetings will be combined with the meetings held here
and a consolidated report will be made.
The good news, for those interested, is that we will be holding a joint
teleconference where that report will be presented to all off the volunteer participants
from Germany and here. You will be invited to express your opinions about this
consolidated report before it goes to management. Your final opinions will be included
in the final report.
Thanks so much for your time!
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